Support for Technocratic Decision-Making in the OECD Countries: Attitudes toward Apolitical Politics by Lindstam, Emmy
Support for Technocratic Decision-Making in the
OECD Countries: Attitudes toward Apolitical
Politics
EMMY LINDSTAM
Universitat de Barcelona
Treball Fi de Grau
Supervised by Joan-Josep Vallbe´
May 2014
1To my father, a scientist dedicated to the di↵usion of knowledge. He would
have been very proud.
Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Literature Revision 5
2.1 Defining technocracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 The epistemological foundations of technocratic thought . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Technocracy and democracy: An impossible coexistence? . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 The political use of knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 Hypotheses 15
3.1 Education and technocratic attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Technocratic attitudes and political behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Research Design 20
4.1 Method and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2 Dependent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.1 Creating the ‘technocratic mentality index’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3 Independent and control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4 Methodological concerns and robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Results 28
5.1 Explaining technocratic attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Explaining political behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 Discussion 38
6.1 Technocracy, power and social control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2 Technocratic attitudes and vote incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7 Conclusion 47
A Regression results 53
B Descriptive statistics 60
C Images, tables and variables 63
2
Chapter 1
Introduction
Why talk about technocracy in a time when democracies are consolidating all over the world?
The term rings of something out-dated and archaic, more suited to the Cold War era, or
a George Orwell novel. Out of all possible subjects, why dedicate hours of research to this
phenomenon which in no way constitutes a threat to the hegemony of liberal democracies
today? This paper will argue that technocracy is indeed a relevant concept in modern
societies. Not only has the current financial crisis provoked the formation of temporary
technocratic governments in certain European countries, but the technocratic framing of
policy-questions and the use of expert knowledge to define political goals are characteristics
of present-day policy making which have perhaps not received the full scholarly attention
they deserve. This paper will insist that technocracy is not only a system of governance where
experts rule by virtue of their knowledge; it is a decision-making paradigm functioning within
contemporary democracies.
The motivations for carrying out this study are both personal and academic. At a
personal level, the chance to observe the Spanish government’s policy responses to combat
the financial crisis during these past five years has served as a source of motivation for
examining technocratic decision-making. Top-down policies have been implemented and
justified in terms of e ciency and e↵ectiveness and what has been deemed good for the
financial sector and the economic system has been presented as representing the ‘public
interest’ without further debate. However, most policies have made “the burden of the
mistakes of the rich fall on the poor”(Palat, 2012:1) by cutting public spending where it
hurts the most and invariably favouring capital over labour. Unable to counter-argue what
prestigious financial institutions claim to be true, citizens have become truly disenfranchised
when it comes to influencing the choice of policies to combat the current financial situation.
In spite of this, the support for technocratic decision-making is considerably high in Spain
and in the countries of the OECD. Questions such as who supports technocratic decision-
making and what might explain this support inspire further inquiry.
On an academic level, this study aims to contribute to a theory of post-industrial tech-
nocracy to which, according to Fischer (1990:17), contemporary social and political theory
has yet to “devote the kind of serious attention it requires”. As we will argue in this paper,
research should not only focus on who takes decisions in a system of governance, but how
3
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
these decisions are made. The mode of policy-making has changed during the last decades
and has become increasingly technical. The implications of this changed nature of politics
should not be trivialized, rather research on decision-making paradigms and their implica-
tions on democratic quality are of upmost relevance. The essence of our contribution resides
in the choice to study technocracy at an attitudinal level. Authors such as Centeno (1993),
Laird (1990) and Fischer (1990) have all contributed to a theoretical and conceptual study
of contemporary technocracy but little has been said about people’s attitudes toward techno-
cratic decision-making. The belief that we can learn more about contemporary technocracy
by studying the attitudes and behaviour of people in modern post-industrial societies thus
motivates this individual-data level study.
The purpose of this paper is, as insinuated, to study technocratic attitudes. We will
define what we mean by technocratic attitudes and we will analyse what explains this frame
of mind among individuals. Specifically we wish to study the relationship between education
and technocratic attitudes. According to conventional wisdom experts are more likely to
support technocracy since this gives them more political power and opportunities to influence
policy. In this paper, however, we will argue that higher education does not necessarily lead
to higher levels of technocratic mentality and we open a discussion as to why. Furthermore,
we will examine how people with technocratic attitudes behave politically. Do they have
specific party preferences? Do they participate in elections? The purpose of this is to derive
what political implications technocratic mentality may have at an individual level and for
society as a whole.
The first part of this paper revises the literature on technocracy. We discuss how tech-
nocracy has been defined in the past and how contemporary authors interpret the concept
today. We continue by analysing the epistemological foundations of technocratic thought in
an intent to understand the roots of contemporary technocratic thinking. In the next section
we examine the relationship between technocracy and democracy, commenting on both ob-
vious ‘frictions’ between the two concepts, but also on possible ‘democratic externalities’ of
technocratic decision-making. Finally we conclude our literature revision by analysing how
expert knowledge has been put to use for political purposes and how science can serve to
legitimize certain ideological interests. Our next chapter presents our hypotheses. We define
what we mean by technocratic attitudes and then move on to look at how education might
a↵ect these attitudes and how this mind-set in turn may explain political behaviour, present-
ing various hypotheses to be contrasted empirically. The next chapter describes our research
design. We use data from the World Values Survey in order to run multivariate regressions
and study the di↵erent relationships in quantitative terms. We continue by presenting our
regression results and finally, in the last part of this paper, we discuss our results making
more detailed interpretations and, when needed, presenting alternative hypotheses.
Chapter 2
Literature Revision
2.1 Defining technocracy
Few terms are used in such a vague manner as technocracy. While we often encounter the
word in newspaper articles, blogs and books, little intent is generally made to define the
concept in a rigorous way. Perhaps the ‘problem’ when it comes to defining technocracy
is that its significance is evolving; it does not mean the same thing today as it did 30-40
years ago. Much like democracy, a concept that has gone through di↵erent transformations
over time, technocracy is an ever changing notion that evolves alongside industrial society.
A classical definition of technocracy would be something along the lines of: “a system of
governance in which technically trained experts rule by virtue of their specialized knowledge
and position in dominant political and economic institutions” (Meynaud, 1969:31). The main
idea is that while democracy refers to the rule by the people (demos), technocracy refers to the
rule by experts. The term was first coined in 1919 by William Henry Smyth, an American
engineer, and was broadly used in the 70’s when technocracy appeared to be a feasible
future form of government. Many believed scientists would replace traditional politicians as
skilled individuals increasingly filled leading government positions both in democratic and
undemocratic regimes. Reagan for example was an economist and Gorbachev an engineer
(Ribbhagen, 2010; Fischer, 1990).
During this time period the concept of technocracy attracted considerable scholarly at-
tention. Meynaud (1963:31) defined technocracy as “the rise to power of those who possess
technical knowledge or ability, to the detriment of the traditional politicians” and Burnham
(1941) argued that ‘managers’ would become the new ruling class, gaining power on the basis
of their technical superiority. Galbraith (1967) later developed the term technostructure in
order to describe the large network of technical experts which would constitute the ‘guiding
intelligence’ in group decision-making in modern societies. Implications of the technocracy
were intensely debated. While some viewed technocracy as an inevitable step for complex
post-industrialized societies, others debated the perceived tensions between technocracy and
democracy. Many pointed at the apparent di culties of ensuring public participation in
increasingly complex societies (Dewey, 1927) as well as at the apparent contradictions in the
simultaneous transitions toward democracy and the market (Centeno, 1993).
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Other authors have focused on defining what characterizes a technocrat. According to
Bell (1973:348) “the technocrat is one who exercises authority by virtue of his technical
competence. [...] In the post-industrial society, technical skills become the base of and
education the mode of access to power”. Skills and expertise have often been considered
the main characteristics shared by individuals with a technocratic mind-set. Putnam (1977)
went a step further by attempting to turn the question of who should be considered a
technocrat into an empirical case by exploring technocratic mentality among elite bureaucrats
in Britain, Germany and Italy. Putnam argued that a technocratic mentality is primarily
composed by six elements. First, a technocrat believes that “technics must replace politics
and defines his own role in apolitical terms” (Putnam, 1977:387). A technocrat frowns
upon political negotiation and debate considering that problem solving requires a strict
rational approach. Second, “the technocrat is sceptical and even hostile toward politicians
and political institutions” (Putnam, 1977: 386). Technocrats consider politicians to be
guided by specific, partial interests, pursuing sub-optimal solutions. Third, “the technocrat is
fundamentally unsympathetic to the openness and equality of political democracy” (Putnam,
1977: 386). Since citizens aren’t experts, their contribution can do little for the quality of
decision-making. Fourth, “the technocrat believes that social and political conflict is, at best,
misguided, and, at worst, contrived” (Putnam, 1977: 386). Negotiations and bargaining is
fruitless and ine cient as there is an optimal solution to each given problem. Fifth, “the
technocrat rejects ideological or moralistic criteria, preferring to debate policy in practical,
‘pragmatic’ terms when analysing public issues” (Putnam, 1977: 387). What is good or
what is right is not a criterion for a technocrat, rather the right question to ask is whether
the policy will work e↵ectively and e ciently. Sixth, “the technocrat is strongly committed
to technological progress and material productivity; he is less concerned about distributive
questions of social justice” (Putnam, 1977: 387). E↵ectiveness and e ciency become goals
in themselves overriding normative objectives.
In the following decades, the public and academic debate concerning technocracy lost
general interest. As democracies were consolidated all over the world people argued that
technocratic governance could never become a reality. In spite of this, more recently, various
authors have argued that technocracy is indeed a highly relevant concept today (Fischer,
1990; Centeno, 1993; Greenwald, 1979; Ribbhagen, 2013). Ribbhagen (2010) points out that
the current financial crisis which has brought about technocratic governments in Greece and
Italy, has in fact rekindled the debate on technocracy. Furthermore, as Bourdieu (2002)
and Dahl (1994) note, the implications of globalization on the retreat of democracy due to
technocratic trends have led to the increased power of international financial institutions and
corporations lead by experts.
Centeno (1993:314) defines technocracy as: “the administrative and political domination
of a society by a state elite and allied institutions that seek to impose a single, exclusive policy
paradigm based on the application of instrumental rational techniques”. This definition is
more subtle than previous ones. Centeno emphasizes the imposition of an exclusive ‘policy
paradigm’ as the defining element of technocracy. Various authors have in fact identified
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a new, contemporary form of technocracy referring to the transformed nature of politics
(Laird, 1990; Fisher, 1990; Ribbhagen, 2013). These authors highlight the depolitization
of politics in recent years arguing that technocracy is not so much about who rules as the
nature of politics or as Ribbhagen (2013: 16) puts it: “the crucial issue for the definition
of technocracy then is not who governs, rather it lies in the mode of politics”. According
to this perspective, technocracy should not be understood as the rule by experts but as the
government by technique, focusing on the procedures and content of politics (Ribbhagen,
2013).
According to Laird (1990:51) contemporary technocracy should not be defined by who
gains power, but by who loses it: “the crucial issue is not who gains power but who loses it.
Technocracy is not the rise of experts, it is the decline of citizens”. Fischer (2000:29) adds:
“one of the most important contemporary functions of technocratic politics, it can be argued,
rests not as much on its ascent to power (in the traditional sense of the term) as on the fact
that its growing influence shields the elites from political pressure from below”. Fischer refers
to technocracy as a ‘quiet revolution’ which ultimately has transformed the way we think
about and understand politics (Fischer, 1990:20), it is a meta-phenomenon geared more to the
shape of governance than the content per se (Fischer, 1990:21). Technocratic thinking implies
considering that technical solutions can solve social problems, reducing politics to a process
of ‘fine tuning’: “problem solving is reduced to a technical matter of plugging solutions into
di↵erent social contexts” (Fischer, 1990:43). While experts don’t actually govern in this
new decision-making paradigm, political parties fight for the support of experts in order to
legitimize their own policy inside an increasingly technocratic framework of policy making
that is gaining ground within representative democracies.
Ribbhagen (2013) emphasizes that some definitions and measurements of technocracy
tend to create a false dichotomy between technocracy and democracy. A more accurate
dichotomy, she argues, would be the one between a technocratic mode of reasoning and a
political mode of reasoning. The technocratic mode of reasoning emphasises the economic
aspects of society accentuating the e↵ectiveness and productivity of desired policies. Tech-
nocratic reasoning rejects partisan politics, considering that bargaining, negotiations and
compromise lead to sub-optimal solutions and ine cient policy outcomes. Questions of re-
distribution are of little concern since they are viewed as ‘value-judgments’: “in short, the
technocratic mode of reasoning stresses knowledge, facts and figures while emphasizing e -
ciency, whereas the political mode of reasoning focuses on norms, values and interests in the
democratic process” (Ribbhagen, 2013:20). Other authors discuss the technocratic decision-
making paradigm without actually mentioning the term ‘technocracy’. Manzer (1984) refers
to an ‘elitist planning paradigm’ as opposed to a ‘pluralist exchange paradigm’. While the
elitist planning paradigm refers to policymaking as a result of “anticipatory problem solving,
synoptic planning and rational choice” (Manzer, 1984: 577), policymaking in the pluralist
exchange paradigm is the result of epiphenomenal outcomes of decisions made by individuals
or groups interacting with one another” (Manzer, 1984: 577).
In summary, technocracy can be defined in two di↵erent manners, distinguishable by
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whether they focus on the rise to power of new political actors or whether they focus on the
mode and content of politics. The first definition views technocracy as a political system
where experts take key decisions while the second one refers to a decision-making paradigm
characterized by the technical management of politics. However, although we di↵erentiate
two definitions, one classical and one contemporary, the same basic line of reasoning and
approximation to knowledge underlies both concepts. In fact, they both rest on the same
epistemological foundation, something we will examine closely in the next section.
2.2 The epistemological foundations of technocratic thought
They are particularly inclined to confuse the things of logic with the
logic of things
— Bourdieu, Le Monde Diplomatique
The epistemological foundations of technocratic thought can be traced back to the writings of
Plato. For Plato, social change means degeneration; all things in flux are destined to decay.
In order to know anything definite about the world, he claimed, one must study the ideas ; the
ideal forms from which all things in social reality are copied. Since true reality is veiled (all we
see around us are imperfect copies of the ideas) the task of the pure knowledge is to describe
the true nature of hidden realities (Popper, 2002:27). In the Republic, Plato accordingly put
forth the idea that the wisest and most godlike men: a kingship of philosophers must rule
since they are the only persons who have access to these ideas. Plato’s theory on the ‘rule
of the enlightened’ inspired authors who’s work is more directly connected to technocratic
thought, such as The New Atlantis by Bacon (1622). Bacon developed Plato’s ideas but
envisioned a utopian future where research scientist replace the philosopher-kings.
In the eighteenth-century Enlightenment movement more direct epistemological founda-
tions of technocratic thought were rooted. Saint-Simon is often described as the precursor
of technocracy (Carlisle, 1974; Fisher, 1990; Ribbhagen, 2013). In the wake of the indus-
trial revolution in France, Saint-Simon developed his utopian vision of a state where a new
system of ‘expert management’ would lead society out of the social crises that had followed
the abrupt changes and social uprisings in modern industrialized societies. A new European
hierarchy would be established “based not on social origins but on natural talent and soci-
ety’s requirements” (Fisher, 1990: 69). He explained that the new class of technical experts
was much more valuable to society than the old ruling class of nobles and aristocrats, and
should therefore occupy a more important role in politics. Instrumental importance would
lead to political dominance (Laird, 1990). August Comte evoked Saint-Simons ideas when
developing his theory of ‘positivist knowledge’. Comte di↵erentiated between real knowledge
and mere opinion, explaining that positive knowledge can only be obtained by applying a
universal scientific method to empirical evidence. The scientific method and the verifiability
of empirical findings would permit society to discover ‘scientific laws’ guiding society toward
social progress.
As we see, technocratic thought fundamentally rests on the positivist epistemology. The
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belief in an objective truth which can be discovered by observation and the use of a scientific
method are the essential characteristics of this theory of knowledge. According to positivists,
verified and scientific knowledge is certain. Verified knowledge can thus be considered abso-
lute truth while other forms of knowledge are rejected as meaningless speculation (Del Aguila
and Beltra´n de Felipe, 1995:421). Objective knowledge thus exists independently of us and
can be obtained by carefully separating facts and values. Truth is distinguishable for its
verifiability unlike subjective arguments which contain no verifiable truth.
Weber (1949) was one of the first to question some of these ideas. He explicitly objected
to the idea that rational criteria should determine the ends of policy. Centeno (1993:311)
describes Weber’s critique: “although the choice of means may be justified on a rational basis,
the definition of values, goals and needs necessarily involves subjective criteria”. Science,
Weber argued, cannot liberate the individual from his personal responsibility in choosing
his supreme values. Weber also points out that the search for ‘general laws’ in the realm
of social sciences is exceptionally inadequate. In order to establish general laws which aim
to reflect something as irrational and unpredictable as human behaviour, a great level of
generalization is necessary. The resulting ‘laws’ are exceedingly abstract and lack any real
content, far from portraying the rich reality more qualitative approaches can depict (Weber,
1949).
The two weaknesses in positivist thought detected by Weber much resemble the critiques
of technocratic reasoning we encounter today. First, some argue that technocratic arguments
confuse ends and means. New instruments for public decision-making, such as cost-benefit
analyses are often used in order to defend what policies to implement instead of which man-
ner would be the best way to implement an already defined goal: “much of policy analysis
in this respect has sought to translate inherently normative political and social issues into
technically defined ends to be pursued through administrative means” (Fischer, 1998:4). Sec-
ond, the economic models explaining economic trends and social behaviour which legitimize
technocratic policy-making are sometimes so detached from social reality that although the
models and equations appear internally coherent, they are not supported by real life exam-
ples. Bourdieu explains that many economists “separated from the realities of the economic
and social world by their existence and above all by their intellectual formation, which is most
frequently purely abstract, bookish and theoretical” confuse the logic of their mathematical
models (things of logic) with the actual events in social reality (logic of things) (Bourdieu,
1998). Fisher adds: “neopositivism in its search for such value-neutral generalizations has
sought to detach itself from the very social contexts that can give its data meaning” (Fischer,
1998:140).
As we have seen, the positivist approach to knowledge considers that objective truth
exists out there and can be obtained through scientific inquiry. If truth is objective, there
cannot exist simultaneous incompatible truths. Translated into a political context, two
di↵erent world-views cannot both be ‘right’. Subsequently, if there is a right answer to any
given question, there cannot exist any valid alternatives. The question is, if there are no
alternatives... can we really talk of democracy?
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2.3 Technocracy and democracy: An impossible coexistence?
Truth is not compatible with democracy
— Fernando Vallesp´ın
During the final stages of the Cold War, several authors predicted what they called the ‘end
of ideology’ referring to the expected collapse of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of
liberal democracies throughout the world. Authors predicting this end of adversarial politics
considered that this new era in history would open the doors for democratization and social
progress. Arguments about abstract goals would be replaced by fruitfull social engineering.
Democratic consolidation then, can be associated to the end of traditional politics. Fukuyama
(1989) for example wrote in his famous article ‘The End of History?’: “what we may be
witnessing in not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-
war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human
government” (Fukuyama, 1989:1). However, can technocratic politics really be considered
an opportunity for democracy? Marcuse (1964:11) writes: “this absorption of ideology into
reality does not, however signify the “end of ideology”. On the contrary, in a specific sense
advanced industrial culture is more ideological than its predecessor, inasmuch as today the
ideology is in the process of production itself”. Radaelli (1999) points to the paradoxical
fact that political scientists are fascinated by post-adversarial politics but at the same time
horrified by technocratic policy-making. How can this be when they are fundamentally the
same thing?
The tensions between technocracy and democracy have been carefully examined through-
out the years. While some scholars a rm relevant frictions between technocracy and democ-
racy others describe the concepts as dichotomies arguing that technocracy by definition
cannot be democratic, because the two concepts cannot overlap and coexist. Carlisle (1974)
explains that Saint-Simon is not only known as the precursor of technocracy, but also of
totalitarianism. He describes an authoritarian appeal in Sain-Simon’s paternalistic preach-
ing of the virtues of order and authority and argues: “there is an implied equation in the
argument between technocracy and totalitarianism” (Carlisle, 1974:451). In the journal Le
Producteur Saint-Simon’s followers insisted that since real knowledge can be obtained, there
is little room for discussion in most spheres of social life. This means that men who do not
know should obey men who do know.
As we have seen in a previous section, technocracy can be understood in the classical
sense of the term as the ‘rule by experts’ but also in a more contemporary light as the
‘government by technique’: “the former advocated for a direct rise to power of experts,
whereas the latter is formally respectful of democratic values and institutions” (Radaelli,
1999:4). There is an evident contradiction between technocracy understood as the rule by
experts and democracy understood as the rule by the people: “democracy means rule by the
people (demos) not rule by (technical) experts” (Ribbhagen, 2013). In a technocratic regime,
experts are appointed as rulers by virtue of their knowledge. This elite of experts is expected
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to rule according to what they believe to be best for society, not according to the expressed
wishes of citizens. Elitist authors might argue that democracy inevitably produces governing
elites due to organizational necessities. Michels (1915) for example described an ‘iron law
of oligarchy’ concentrating political power in a small number of people. Schumpeter (1942)
similarly portrayed democracy as the free competition between elites for political power.
Nonetheless, even this technical and restricted view of democracy does not render the two
concepts compatible. Even if governors were elected from a ‘pool’ of experts fulfilling the
democratic requirement of universal active su↵rage, passive su↵rage would be drastically
reduced to include only the most highly educated. While it’s true that everybody cannot
rule in contemporary democratic systems, theoretical political equality is fundamental. As a
result, technocracy in the classical sense of the term cannot be considered compatible with
representative democracy.
When studying the more contemporary definition of technocracy (government by tech-
nique), the relationship between technocracy and democracy appears more complex and
ambivalent. Ribbhagen points out that technocracy understood in this manner does not
necessarily oppose democracy, rather it opposes a political mode of reasoning. The study of
technocracy has recently attracted scholarly attention for its ability to function within demo-
cratic regimes, without questioning basic political institutions. Nevertheless, claiming that
government by technique is compatible with representative democracy does not mean that
technocratic policy-making cannot undermine democratic quality or create frictions with
what some consider fundamental democratic elements such as public participation (Fischer,
1990). Radaelli (1999:3) goes as far as calling technocracy “the dark side of the cognitive di-
mension of politics” explaining that democracy is based on free consensus and participation
none of which technocracies recognize as basis of authority.
In spite of this, some authors argue that technocratic decision-making actually protects
democracy by defending the general will from the influence of particular interests. Tech-
nocratic decision-making shelters socially optimal, e cient policies against ine cient and
incremental decisions born from negotiations. In the history of democratic thought the unity
of the general will of the people has often been emphasised and the heterogeneity of interests
ignored. In fact, the term ‘party government’ was, for a long time, considered a negative
term “connoting conflicts motivated by personal ambitions of politicians [...] and the pur-
suit of particular interests, altogether a rather unsavoury spectacle” (Przeworski, 2010:23).
Although the democratic ideal has been discussed for centuries, self-governance in the pres-
ence of heterogeneity was rarely commented upon until the 20th century. For some authors
however, ‘partisan politics’ is a vital element for democracy. Classical pluralist such as Dahl
(1961) and Truman (1951) explain that elections are not the only channels for democratic
participation. Rather the fact that interest groups can mobilize in the defence of their own
interests is an essential element in any democratic system. According to this pluralistic the-
ory, power is evenly distributed in society and interest groups and counter-groups have equal
chances to mobilize, thus assuring a political equilibrium in society. The main caveat in this
pluralist theory is, as Lindblom (1977) points out, the fact that some organized interests are
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more powerful and have more access to power than others. The ‘structural power of busi-
ness’ links economic and political power and the politicians’ dependence on economic actors
makes them more susceptible to political pressure. This string of thought leads to one of the
most important arguments in support of technocratic management of politics: politicians
that listen too much to narrow interests can pose an equally large threat to democracy as
politicians that ignore interests altogether.
Manzer (1984) explains that while a pluralist-exchange decision-making paradigm is
guided by self-interest and decisions are taken through bargaining and negotiation resulting
in ine cient policies, an elitist-planning model assures self-indi↵erent practical reasoning.
An elitist-planning paradigm is therefore the best way to assure e cient policy-outcomes
and even to protect the interests of minorities whose well-being could easily be overlooked
in a battle between strong, organized interests. The central guidance of decision-making
toward Pareto optimal solutions is in this sense more ‘moral’ than letting vote-maximizing
politicians or budget-maximizing bureaucrats take decisions based on unscientific criteria.
Although this argument is relevant, some questions arise: how can an elite presume to know
the public good? Is there even such a thing as a common good? And how do we trust that
expert knowledge is used in a disinterested manner?
Williams (2006) argues that the tensions between technocracy and democracy are real:
exclusionary, top-down decision-making undercut accountability, transparency and weakens
checks and balances so fundamental for e↵ective representation. However, technocracy, he
explains, can potentially enhance democracy by producing what he calls ‘democratic exter-
nalities’ (Williams, 2006:124). For example, he explains, the “executive’s greater technical
capacity vis-a-vis the legislature incentivizes Congress to upgrade its own technical capac-
ity, bolstering horizontal accountability and e↵ective representation in progress” (Williams,
2006:131). The idea that expert knowledge can be used in such a way as to improve political
debate instead of ending it is undoubtedly interesting and probably fundamental if we wish
to gear decision-making toward more participatory dynamics. Pettit (2004:54) for example
argues that deliberative democracy requires depolitization and that depolitization is in fact
consistent with democracy.
To conclude, while the rule by experts is incompatible with representative democracy,
the government by technique functions within democratic societies. As discussed, some
even argue that technocracy understood as the technical management of politics enhances
democracy by protecting the ‘public interest’ from ‘sectarian interests’. One problem with
this chain of reasoning however is that expert knowledge is not necessarily neutral, or at
least, as we shall see in the next section, is not always used for neutral purposes.
2.4 The political use of knowledge
Although expertise and knowledge are fundamental elements for increasing the quality of
decision-making and democracy, supporters of technocratic decision-making often overlook
two fundamental questions: (1) In a technocratic paradigm, the limits between means and
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ends are easily blurred. Criteria such as e ciency and e↵ectiveness don’t only guide the
implementation of policy but become goals in themselves, thus reducing political goals to
questions of technical adjustment. (2) Although technocrats deny allegiance to any ideology
or interests, “expertise itself turns out not to be the neutral, objective phenomenon that it
has purported to be. Indeed, it has all too often served the ideological function of legitimizing
decisions made elsewhere by political rather than scientific means” (Fischer, 2000:8). From
this point of view, technocracy can be understood not only as the depolitization of politics,
but as the politicization of expertise. The neutrality of empirical evidence disappears once it
is used to win political battles: “perhaps in one sense data can be neutral (and thus speak
for themselves), but as soon as they are introduced into a political process, all such claims
must be abandoned” (Fischer, 1990:169). Some authors have argued that the lack of neu-
trality in scientific research can be explained by contextual and cultural factors. Mannheim
(1936) and other authors dedicated to the study of the sociology of knowledge explain that
neutral or objective knowledge simply doesn’t exist. Cultural and social contexts condition
knowledge and even technical specialists participate in conflicting social forces binding them
to a partisan view of the world. Other authors argue that the politization of expertise is not
so much about unconscious and contextual influences as the result of deliberate strategies of
powerful actors. Radaelli (1999:17) points out that “knowledge always enters the policy pro-
cess in combination with interests, never alone”, Habermas (1987) argues that technocratic
politics serve an end by concealing unreflected social interests and Crouch (2012) explains
that although technocratic discourse finds legitimacy by claiming to reject partisan interests,
the entire discourse is geared toward fulfilling one set of particular interests; the wishes of
global firms and corporations.
The political use of expert knowledge has been an area of interest for contemporary
authors such as Boswell (2009) and Fischer (1990). Both authors agree that expertise is
often used, not in order to improve decision-making, but to serve political interests in some
form or another. Technocratic reasoning and expert knowledge are used in politics as a
means to end debate about intrinsically political and value-laden questions. Instead of using
ideological arguments, aiming to attract the vote of people with certain values or interests,
the technocratic discourse aims to set itself above ideological debate claiming the capability
to ‘prove’ what policies will be the best for society as a whole. According to Lemke (2009:9)
“technocratic discourse does not wish to be read as just one more opinion regarding policy.
It wishes to place itself ‘above the fray’, as a supplier of ‘facts’, neutral and objective”.
Politicians search for the support from ‘experts’ who can produce scientific results permitting
politicians to end political debate about controversial issues. By showing proof of what works
people’s opinions are trivialized.
Boswell (2009) explains that the fact that decision-making has become more and more
technocratic cannot only be explained by the increased complexity of policy-making but
also by the fact that several political parties rely on technocratic discourse as a source of
legitimacy and credibility. Hence, the use of expert knowledge cannot only be viewed as
instrumental (as a means for advancing certain rational organizational goals) but also as
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a source of legitimation and substantiation. Unable to inspire support through adjusting
their output (improving the economy for example), political parties often resort to rhetoric
to gain support and legitimate their actions. Expert knowledge thus helps demonstrate the
rationality of an organizations decision-making style (Boswell, 2009:87). Political actors also
use knowledge to substantiate their actions by persuading citizens through technocratic forms
of argumentation “or at least to deploy evidence that renders opposition to their preferences
less tenable” (Boswell, 2009:73).
Fischer (1990) argues that some political parties tend to use expert knowledge for politi-
cal purposes more than others. By studying the use of expert knowledge before and after the
implementation of policy he finds that scientific requirements for policy-making often benefit
market-friendly or conservative parties. Cost-benefit analyses is a mode of applying expert
knowledge to politics prior to policy-implementation. According to Fischer, demanding cost-
benefit analyses for the implementation of policies imposes an ‘economic grid’ on all policy
decision-making and “subverts the use of noneconomic – social and political – criteria in the
regulatory decision-making process” (Fischer, 1990:166). The influence from private sector
managerial theories has drawn the attention to ‘public management’ and increasing amounts
of policy-makers view the public sector as a sort of ‘enterprise’ to be managed according to
private-sector principles. Showing that a certain policy will work e ciently provides more
legitimacy for the implementation of a policy than its appeal to public interest. What’s
more, studies measuring the benefits of programs oriented to fulfil social needs often under-
estimate social benefits since these are not easily measured in quantitative terms. According
to Fischer, cost-benefit analyses thus benefit right-wing parties by emphasising traditional
capitalist values and facilitating deregulation (Fischer, 1990:165). During the Reagan ad-
ministration, the cost-benefit analysis was diligently used on proposed regulatory policies in
an attempt to impede their implementation.
In a similar fashion, Fischer explains that ex-post policy evaluations have permitted
right-wing politicians to maintain the statu quo and hinder the continuation of already
implemented progressive programs. Requiring proof that social programs really work makes
it much harder to introduce elements of social change. Fischer explains that since proving
that a policy works at times can be extremely di cult due to the complexity of policy
problems and the imperfect knowledge at hand, evaluation findings tend to be negative.
‘Verifying’ that a certain program really works is much more di cult than proving that it
does not: “an emphasis on evaluation builds a conservative bias into the policy decision
processes” (Fischer, 1990: 163). In brief, the use of technocratic discourse and methods
could be understood as ideological strategies, often favouring parties from the right wing,
partly by generating electoral support and partly by advancing their specific interests.
Chapter 3
Hypotheses
The purpose of this paper is to study technocratic attitudes. As previously mentioned,
there have been several attempts to measure technocratic attitudes among civil servants
and highly educated individuals in the past (Putnam, 1977; Greenwald, 1979; Ribbhagen,
2010), however, to our knowledge, no attempts have been made to measure public support for
technocratic decision-making by studying the technocratic attitudes among normal citizens.
Our wish is to contribute to a scientific theory of technocracy, not by studying political
institutions or procedures of decision-making, but by looking at people’s attitudes toward
politics, participation and policy making. When measuring civic culture in the 60’s, Almond
and Verba (1963:10) explained: “rather than inferring the properties of democratic culture
from political institutions or social conditions, we have attempted to specify its content by
examining attitudes in a number of democratic systems”. In a very similar way we attempt
to learn more about technocracy by studying technocratic attitudes in post-industrialised
societies. By explaining technocratic attitudes among people from the OECD countries, as
well as by considering how technocratic attitudes might a↵ect people’s political behaviour,
we aim to advance the research on technocratic mentality.
The literature suggests that education is fundamental for technocratic thinking. Since
technocracy defends a more prominent and dominant role for expert knowledge in society
and politics, it is assumed to be natural that individuals with a higher level of expertise
support technocratic decision-making. The first part of our empirical section will test this
assumption. The second part of our empirical section will look at the relationship between
technocratic attitudes and political behaviour such as voting and party preferences in an
intent to shed some light on the political consequences of technocratic mentality. While our
first section studies technocratic attitudes as a dependent variable, the second section looks
at technocratic attitudes as an independent variable:
Education! Technocratic Attitudes! Political Behaviour (3.1)
First of all however we must outline what we mean by the concept ‘technocratic atti-
tudes’. As we have seen, the literature suggests that technocracy should not only be under-
stood as a political system in which experts rule, but also, and currently more importantly,
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as a decision-making paradigm compatible with representative democracy. Our first task is
therefore to define what we mean by technocratic attitudes. In accordance with the literature
we distinguish between two ‘types’ of technocratic attitudes. The first reflects the support
for technocratic government as defined by early theories, the other, reflects the support for
technocratic decision-making as defined by more contemporary studies.
Definition 1 = Support for the rule by experts
Definition 2 = Support for government by technique
While the first definition expresses the wish for decisions to be made by experts, not
government, the second definition describes a preference for the technical management of
politics, prioritizing rational policy planning over more pluralistic and participatory forms
of policy-making. Once these definitions are clear, a second goal for our study becomes
evident. Not only do we wish to study the relationship between education, technocratic
attitudes and political behaviour, we also wish to study the empirical di↵erences between
our two definitions of technocratic attitudes. One of the main theoretical di↵erences between
the two definitions of technocracy is that the more contemporary definition is assumed to be
compatible with and functioning within representative democracy. When studied empirically,
will the theoretical distinction discussed be revealed? For example, while we assume that
supporters of anti-democratic technocracy show no support for representative democracy
and tend to abstain from democratic processes, we expect that supporters of the democratic
form of technocracy very well might participate.
In summary, we identify three relationships of interest in our study namely the rela-
tionships between technocratic attitudes and (1) education, (2) political behaviour and (3)
democracy. While our first empirical section which aims to explain technocratic attitudes
focuses on the relationship between education and technocratic attitudes, our second empir-
ical section which studies the political consequences of technocratic attitudes concentrates
on the relationship between technocratic attitudes and political behaviour. The relationship
between democracy and technocracy will be discussed in both parts.
3.1 Education and technocratic attitudes
When attempting to explain technocratic attitudes we wish to study the relationship between
education and technocratic attitudes. Since it is assumed that only experts have technocratic
attitudes, previous studies have concentrated on studying technocratic mentality among
highly educated individuals. This study however will examine if variations in the level of
expertise can explain technocratic attitudes1. According to conventional wisdom technocracy
is an ‘ideology of the highly skilled’. Greenwald (1979:632) points out that “in debate filled
1One may ask whether a high level of education naturally implies a high level of expertise. Putnam
considers this to be the case: ”given the curricular specialization characteristic of most European universities,
a university degree represents considerable disciplinary commitment and expertise” (1977:389).
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with untested assumptions, many theorists imply that technocratic ideology appeals strongly
to those who occupy the top strata of science and technology”. Burnham (1941) for example
calls technocracy a ‘managerial ideology’, shared by technically qualified individuals, and
Habermas (1987) refers to technocracy as the ideology of the socially advantaged in the
professional community. In spite of these claims, other theories and ideas make us doubt
whether this really is the case. Greenwald comments: “technocracy seems unlikely to enjoy
the universal support of experts [...] fragmentary and indirect evidence, though, suggest that
technocratic thought may be anything but an ideology of highly advantaged professionals
and top managerial personnel” (Greenwald, 1979: 632).
When looking at our first definition of technocratic attitudes (rule by experts) theo-
ries on democratic support contradict the conventional assumption that education leads to
technocratic mentality. Since this definition measures the support for, what we consider,
an intrinsically anti-democratic regime, it is highly probable that supporters of the rule by
experts have what we might call anti-democratic values, opposed to representative democ-
racy. There is a relatively large consensus among academics that poor and less educated
people in developed countries have less democratic values (Almond & Verba, 1967; Lijphart,
1997). Maslow’s theory describing a ‘hierarchy of needs’ explains that less a✏uent people
are more preoccupied with urgent materialistic needs and consequently care more about eco-
nomic outcomes of policy (such as growth) than democratic procedures. Inglehart (2000)
similarly emphasises that people with less knowledge and less economic security tend to have
what he calls survival values rather than self-expression values. If lower levels of education
are indeed related to anti-democratic values, we would expect to see a negative relationship
between education and the support for the rule by experts (H1).
This argument rests on the assumption that the e↵ects of education on the support for
the rule by experts are indirect ; the relationship is mediated by anti-democratic values. As
argued, the technocratic attitudes in question are strongly associated to anti-democratic
values which are in turn often shown to be related to education. If the relationship between
education and the support for the rule by experts is indeed explained by anti-democratic
values, we should not expect education to have any e↵ect on these technocratic attitudes
once we control for anti-democratic values.
Education! Anti-democratic values! Support for the rule by experts (3.2)
When looking at our second definition of technocratic attitudes (government by tech-
nique) we see no clear contradiction between the support for representative democracy and
technocratic attitudes. Consequently we do not expect anti-democratic values to mediate the
relationship between education and the support for government by technique. This however
does not mean that no relationship between education and the preference for the technical
management of politics will be observed. We can think of two alternative theories to describe
the mechanisms through which a direct e↵ect of education on the support for government by
technique could take place. (1) As conventional wisdom has it, people with more expertise
defend the dominant role of expert knowledge since it gives them a more influential role
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in society. Therefore higher levels of education lead to stronger support for government by
technique (H2). (2) People with less expertise have less capacity to question what tech-
nocrats present as ‘true’ and are therefore more inclined to believe in the e↵ectiveness of
their proposed policies. In consequence lower levels of education lead to stronger support for
government by technique (H3).
3.2 Technocratic attitudes and political behaviour
The second part of our empirical section studies the e↵ects of technocratic attitudes on po-
litical behaviour. For instance, do we expect supporters of technocratic decision-making to
support political parties from a specific ideology? Let’s first look at the support for gov-
ernment by technique. As we have seen in previous chapters, technocratic reasoning is not
value-free and neutral although it is presented as such: “the notion that the technocratic set
of criteria may be structured in such a way that they benefit a particular group is not only
possible but also probable. The important point here, however, is that the public discourse
of technocracy rejects such a linkage” (Ribbhagen, 2013:22). Many associate contemporary
technocracy with a subtle political strategy of the right wing. Although it would be an er-
ror to claim that only right-wing parties use a technocratic discourse for political purposes,
Reagan and Thatcher set the trend as early as the late 70s with their lemma ‘there is no
alternative’: “the adaption of technocratic decision techniques to the pursuit of the conser-
vative agenda proved to be a key strategy of the Reagan Revolution” (Fischer, 1990:26).
Authors such as Bourdieu associate technocratic thinking with neoliberal policies defending
free capital flows. Globalization, Bourdieu writes “is the e↵ect not of economic inevitabil-
ity but of conscious and deliberate policy [. . . ] it is a policy of depolitization” (Bourdieu,
2002:31). Centeno remarks that “there may be a certain a nity between technocracy and
market capitalism [. . . ] capitalism legitimizes itself partly by reference to the apparent ef-
ficiency of its economic mechanisms. This is precisely the type of argument that is most
conducive to technocratic support” (Centeno, 1993: 311). Fischer agrees and highlights that
the conflict between e ciency and participation fits into the left-wing ideological spectrum.
While the left wing often calls for more democracy and participation, the right wing will
often defend e ciency over participation. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that people
who support government by technique will show support for right-wing parties (H4).
When looking at the support for the rule by experts, the theoretical connection between
technocratic attitudes and the preference for right-wing parties is less clear. There is no
clear link between classical technocracy and party preference. The important point here is
that no political party stands for elections proposing to hand over their political power to
unelected o cials. There is therefore no reason why people who support the rule of experts
would vote for one party or another. That is, people who support the rule by experts don’t
prefer specific parties over others (H5).
Finally, voting abstention is an interesting variable when exploring the political implica-
tions of technocratic attitudes. It may also be a central variable for studying the di↵erences
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between technocratic attitudes and their connection to democracy. An intuitive hypothe-
ses is that people who support an undemocratic rule by experts are more likely to abstain
from voting in elections (H6). After all, they show little support for basic democratic ideals
and show no regard for public participation in policy-making. Supporters of government by
technique, on the other hand, could very well participate, seeing that they are not ques-
tioning the general framework of contemporary democratic societies. Although we expect
these individuals to dislike partisan activity, interest-group politics and a more pluralistic
form of politics, there is no reason why they should disrespect or dislike democratic gover-
nance. Consequently, a credible hypothesis would be that people who support government by
technique are as likely to participate in elections as others (H7).
Chapter 4
Research Design
4.1 Method and data
When fashioning our research design, our primary sources of inspiration come from individual
data level studies which analyse the social factors explaining political attitudes such as
Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Evans and Rose (2007) as well
as studies aspiring to measure technocratic mentality such as Putnam (1977), Greenwald
(1979) and Ribbhagen (2010). The first group of studies teach us important lessons on how
to design an attitudinal study and what factors to take into account. The second group of
studies helps us operationalize technocratic attitudes in order to empirically measure this
complex concept.
We chose to work with data from individuals residing in the OECD countries in view
of the fact that technocracy is a concept very much associated with advanced industrial
societies. As an objective is to examine technocracy in representative democracies, the
democratic OECD countries provide a natural setting. In order to measure the technocratic
attitudes of individuals in the OECD countries we use data collected by the World Values
Survey1. We use an aggregate data set of all the five waves of this survey2 obtaining a large
data set of approximately 60.000 observations. We chose to work with this aggregated data
set mainly because it permits us to check whether or not we observe similar tendencies over
time. By controlling for time fixed e↵ects in our multivariate regression models we can make
sure that the same explanatory variables are related to technocratic attitudes independently
of the specific time period when the survey was conducted.
We use multivariate regression models in order to measure the e↵ect of our independent
variables on our dependent variables. In the first part of our empirical section we look at
the e↵ect of education on technocratic attitudes, taking into account other important factors
which might be related to both variables. We estimate a reduced form regression that takes
the form:
1www.worldvaluessurvey.org
2The waves of the survey are: 1981-1989, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, 2005-2007. The data from the
most recent wave were published on the 30th of April 2014 and could not be used in this study.
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TAijw = Cj + Tw +  educationijw + ⇣Xijw + ✏ijw (4.1)
where TAijw represents technocratic attitudes for individual i in country j in wave w,
Cj represents country fixed e↵ects, Tw refers to wave fixed e↵ects, Xijw refers to a matrix
of controls, and ✏ijw is the error term. When our dependent variable is categorical, we use
binary logistic regressions to produce odd ratios. When our dependent variable is continuous,
we use ordinary least square regressions to estimate our model. In the second part of our
empirical section we use technocratic attitudes as an independent variable when estimating
their e↵ect on political behaviour. We estimate the following regression:
PBijw = Cj + Tw +  TAijw + ⇣Xijw + ✏ijw (4.2)
where PB stands for political behaviour representing voting abstention and ideological
party preference3.
4.2 Dependent variables
In the first part of our empirical section our conceptual dependent variables are technocratic
attitudes understood as (1) the support for a rule by experts, and (2) support for government
by technique. Operationalizing our first definition is quite straightforward. Variable number
E115 of the World Value Survey asks:
Is having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for
the country a very good, good, bad or very bad option?
This variable captures the support for decision-making by experts, independently of the
democratically chosen politicians. We collapse the responses into two values where 0 includes
the responses ‘very bad’ and ‘bad’ (not technocratic) and 1 includes the answers ‘good’ and
‘very good’ (technocratic)4. Operationalizing our second definition is more di cult. We
create an index called the ‘technocratic mentality index’ drawing on a previous index created
by Putnam (1977). It is a continuous variable taking on values ranging from 0 to 1.
When measuring the implications of having technocratic attitudes in the second part of
our empirical section our conceptual dependent variables are voting abstention and ideological
party preference. By ideological party preference we mean the ideological position of the
political party to which the respondent feels the closest to and intends to vote for. The
data used to measure the respondents ideological preferences come from the Comparative
Manifesto Project5. The project makes quantitative content analyses of political parties’
electoral programs and (among other things) attribute a value to each party on a right-left
3When analysing ideological party preference we do not use wave fixed e↵ects since, in this case, we only
work with data from the last wave of the survey.
4Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in the appendix B.
5https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/
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ideological scale. We have created a new variable by using the normalized Rile Index from
the Manifesto Project. Variable E179 of the World Value Survey indicates what party the
respondents say they would vote for as a first choice. By recoding all of these parties by
their score on the rile index, attributing a number between -1 and 1 to every party, we are
able to study the ideological preferences of the respondents. Although the World Values
Survey collects data on the respondents’ ideological self-positioning, what we are interested
in studying is not the respondents’ auto-perceived ideology (which in any case is a very
subjective notion), but their political behaviour measured in terms of party preferences.
Recoding the political parties by their score on the ideological index is, above all, an e cient
way to make a universal cross-country scale permitting us to compare party preferences
across countries.
Finally we measure abstention by converting the original variable E179 measuring vote
intention into a binary variable where 0 stands for voting for any party and 1 stands for not
wishing to vote for any party. This operationalization has obvious limits; it only measures
the abstention of those individuals who admit that they don’t intend to vote. This produces
an important selection bias by only taking into consideration ‘honest abstainers’. The World
Values survey does not, however, supply any other measure for voting abstention.6
4.2.1 Creating the ‘technocratic mentality index’
Measuring technocratic attitudes, understood as the support for government by technique,
is not a simple task. The idea is to try to discern a specific ‘mentality’ among individuals;
a positive attitude toward decision-making based on the reasoning that there are optimal
solutions to social problems, that e ciency and e↵ectiveness are goals in themselves and that
expert knowledge and the scientific method will assure social progress. As discussed in the
previous chapter, there have been several attempts to measure ‘technocratic mentality’ in
the past. Drawing on the ‘technocratic mentality index’ created by Putnam (1977) and later
adapted and used by Ribbhagen (2010) we create a new index from the variables available
to us in the World Values Survey, adapted to apply to the public at large. Our technocratic
mentality index is made up by the variables seen in table 4.1.
Variable label
Politics important
Interest in Politics
Political action: Signing a Petition
Future changes: more emphasis on technology
Aims of respondent: first choice (stable economy)
Wealth Accumulation (sum-positive solutions)
Table 4.1: Variables in technocratic mentality index
Though Putnam measured technocratic mentality in the 70’s and did not distinguish
between a classical and contemporary understanding of technocracy, his description of what
constitutes a technocratic mentality is very much in line with how we believe a supporter
6This specific methodology has been used in other academic papers. See Karp and Banducci (2006).
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of technocratic decision-making should be described. His index looks to decipher how in-
dividuals think about decision-making and does not refer to who should rise to power or
take key decisions. Ribbhagen (2010) later uses the same index explicitly claiming to study
technocracy understood as the government by technique. We make a couple of adjustments
in order to improve the validity of the index, but remain relatively true to Putnam’s original.
Putnam develops five indicators in order to measure this specific mentality. First he
explains that an individual with a technocratic mentality will have a negative attitude toward
politics. An individual with a technocratic attitude believes that “technics must replace
politics” and is “likely to regard processes of negotiation and compromise among interest
with a certain contempt” (Putnam, 1977: 385). The first two variables of our ‘technocratic
mentality index’, which discern whether politics is important for the respondent and whether
the respondent is interested in politics, aim to capture this negative attitude toward politics.
Second, Putnam describes a polarity between neutrality versus advocacy. An individual with
a technocratic mentality is “free from political attachments” and “abstains from partisan
activities” (Putnam, 1977:386). Abstaining from partisan activity does not have to mean
abstaining from all political participation such as elections; rather it refers to abstaining
from what we might call ‘partisan politics’ or ‘pressure politics’. An individual who supports
technocratic decision-making will frown upon interests groups intervening in the political
process and abstain from participation in demonstrations or signing petitions since he believes
such activities will interrupt rational policy planning. Decisions should be made according
to the prescriptions of scientific knowledge, not by the pressure exercised by the uninformed.
Our third variable, which checks whether or not the respondent has ever signed a petition
tries to capture this notion. Third, Putnam develops an indicator which looks at technique
versus politics. He explains that “the technocrat is strongly committed to technological
progress and material productivity” (Putnam, 1977: 387). Our forth variable measures
whether or not the respondent looks positively upon technological progress, measuring this
commitment and belief in the value of scientific advance. Finally Putnam measures political
elitism explaining that individuals who share a technocratic mentality “lack sympathy for
popular participation in government” (Putnam, 1977: 398). A technocrat is no friend of
openness or of the equality of political democracy since public participation won’t increase
the quality of decision-making. Our sixth variable measures whether the respondent values
materialistic goals such as controlling inflation over giving people more to say in public
decisions.
Putnam also argues that: “the technocrat is sceptical and hostile toward politicians and
political institutions”: individuals with a technocratic mentality “view politicians as venal,
incompetent or impotent [. . . ] by the nature of things, committed either to an ideology or
to a sectional interest” (Putnam, 1977: 386). Although we could include this indicator by
measuring the ‘confidence in political parties’ we don’t consider it to be a valid indicator
of contemporary technocratic mentality. Supporters of technocratic decision-making accept,
even respect politicians and political institutions, they just wish them to take decisions
according to a technocratic framework. What we aim to measure is not the disa↵ection
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with politicians, rather the disa↵ection with traditional partisan politics. Bearing this in
mind, we swap this variable for another one which perhaps better represents the support
for contemporary technocracy. This sixth variable attempts to measure the belief of the
respondent in sum-positive solutions. Does the respondent consider that policy change always
creates winners and losers, or does he/she believe that most policies have optimal solutions?
According to Radaelli (1999:7) the emphasis on positive-sum games is consistent with the
essential thrust of the technocratic mentality. The question whether the respondent believes
that people can only get rich at the expense of others or whether wealth can grow so there’s
enough for everyone is meant to capture this attitude.
Figure 4.1: Technocratic mentality
4.3 Independent and control variables
In the first part of our empirical section our main independent variable is level of education.
Conceptually we are interested in how knowledge and expertise relate to the support for
technocratic decision-making. Question X025R of the World Value Survey permits us to
operationalize the variable. It is an ordinal variable and has three categories ranging from
‘education lower’ to ‘education middle’ and ‘education upper’.
When choosing what control variables to use we draw on previous research of politi-
cal attitudes. Evans and Rose (2007) explain that when measuring social factors related
to democratic attitudes the most important control variables to include in a multivariate
regression model are “those socio-demographic attributes that could, independently of edu-
cational level, cause citizens to have a more or less supportive attitude towards democracy”
(2007: 9). E↵ectively, we primarily wish to study the e↵ect of education on technocratic
attitudes. Omitting other variables which might explain technocratic attitudes is not nec-
essarily a severe problem, as long as these other variables are not also related to education.
We have therefore tried to include any key variables which may be related to both education
and technocratic attitudes. We include income and occupation as socioeconomic control
variables. The socioeconomic background of the respondents’ may very possibly a↵ect their
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technocratic attitudes. Although this e↵ect undoubtedly is interesting, our main interest
is the relationship between knowledge and technocratic support, independently of socioeco-
nomic status. Controlling for income permits us to talk about education less as a proxy for
socioeconomic background and more as an indicator of expertise. Controlling for occupation
is also important. Some argue that the ‘type of training’ rather than the level of training is
fundamental. Since occupation directly depends on the type of training one has received we
include it in our matrix of controls.
Next we control for demographic variables. Age for example could be related both to
education and technocratic attitudes, the same goes for gender. Since we are working with
data from respondents from many di↵erent countries and during five di↵erent time periods,
we also wish to control for the e↵ects of ‘country’ and ‘wave’. By using country and time
fixed e↵ects we make sure that the relationships we see in the data exist independently of
time-invariant country specific characteristics as well as specific time-related incidents such
as economic recessions.
Finally, we add a control variable for ‘anti-democratic values’ in our regression. As
explained, we wish to study the relationship between education, anti-democratic values and
technocratic attitudes. We are primarily interested in attitudes which show an opposition to
representative democracy, (more subtle democratic attitudes are less helpful to us since we
don’t believe them to vary considerably among both types of technocratic attitudes). We
use variable E114 from the World Values Survey which asks whether the respondent thinks
that ”having a strong leader who doesn’t have to bother with parliament and elections is a
‘very bad’, ‘bad’, ‘good’ or ‘very good’ option”.
In the second part of our empirical section our two variables measuring technocratic
attitudes serve as independent variables explaining political behaviour. The point here is
to analyse the political implications of technocratic attitudes and see if we can further dif-
ferentiate the technocratic supporters by analysing their behaviour. We include the same
demographic control variables as in the previous multivariate regressions. We control for age,
gender and country and time fixed e↵ects considering their possible relationship with both
the independent and dependent variables7. We also include the socioeconomic control vari-
ables: education, income and occupation for the same reasons. In the final models we also
add our anti-democratic control variable in an attempt to see whether technocratic attitudes
a↵ect abstention independently of anti-democratic values.
4.4 Methodological concerns and robustness
Although we control for various factors which might be related to both our independent
and dependent variables the risk for an ‘omitted variable bias’ is still at large. Since we
are working with survey data, not all variables we might wish to study are available. For
instance, the attitudes of the respondents’ parents could a↵ect both the education level of
the respondent and his specific set of attitudes. If this were so, our coe cients would actually
7When looking at ideological party preferences we use data only from 2005 and therefore do not check for
time fixed e↵ects.
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be capturing the e↵ect of an omitted variable rather than the variable under study. Without
a fully specified theoretical model it becomes impossible to say in which direction this bias
will run. As can be seen in our tables of results in the next chapter, the R-square statistic
for our models tends to be quite low; it rarely exceeds 0.250. This might indicate that
we have left out various important variables while constructing our models8. We are very
aware of these problems but our empirical exercise is based on both rich existing literature
and our careful discussion on the theoretical channels through which education could a↵ect
technocratic attitudes. Therefore, although our results should be interpreted with caution,
we believe that they cannot be purely attributed to such a bias.
Another concern when working with survey data is the risk of untruthful answers. It
is sometimes claimed that well-educated respondents hesitate when answering questions re-
lating to their political behaviour since they feel more social pressure to behave as a civic
citizen. Such an e↵ect could a↵ect our results by introducing a systemic bias in the respon-
dents’ answers. For example, when measuring voting abstention, only 2% of the respondents
admit they do not intend to vote for any party, when real figures for voting abstention in
the OECD countries are much higher. To a certain extent, we therefore end up comparing
people who admit they are not going to vote with people who claim they will, but end up
not doing so. The reader should therefore be aware of these limits when interpreting the
results.
When looking at the e↵ect of technocratic attitudes on party preferences, there is an
inevitable risk for reverse-causality. The preference for a right-wing party and the exposure
to this party over time may lead to a more positive view of technocratic decision-making.
Again, the reader should be aware of this when interpreting the results.
Another concern has to do with our technocratic mentality index. Are we really measuring
what we have set out to measure? We have tried to address potential validity problems
by carefully justifying all variables included in the index referring to previous literature
and conceptual arguments. When operationalizing the index we wish to address reliability
concerns. The index can be constructed in di↵erent ways and we want to make sure that
the results do not depend on the specific way we chose to measure our index. We have
therefore constructed three di↵erent indexes all including the six variables. Index number 1
was created by attributing a value of either 0 or 1 to the possible answers of the questions.
For example an individual with little or very little interest in politics, or who never has signed
a petition receives a 1 in each respective question. When constructing Index number 2 we
simply made sure all scales were oriented in the same direction (less to more technocratic)
and then divided all variables by their maximum value. Index number 3 was created in the
same way as Index 1 only using a more restrictive criterion when establishing what counts
as having technocratic attitudes. In order to avoid being tiresome in the presentation of our
results, we present the results using one index (number 1). All other results are shown in
8However, the relatively low value of this statistic might also be attributed to the great variation in the
contestants’ responses. We are after all working with attitudinal data at times with as many as 60.000
observations. It is to be expected that a large amount of the variation in our dependent variables cannot be
attributed to any independent variable.
CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN 27
the appendix A. The results remain very similar and the correlation coe cients between the
di↵erent indexes are high and significant 9.
Finally, when adding control variables to our regression models the number of obser-
vations sometimes decreases quite significantly. In one case, the R-square statistic even
decreases when adding a final variable as a result of this. As a robustness check we have
therefore re-estimated the relevant coe cients with the smallest sub-sample in each case.
The coe cients remain very similar and we choose not to present them in the tables.
9See appendix C for the correlation coe cients.
Chapter 5
Results
5.1 Explaining technocratic attitudes
Table 5.1 shows the results of our first logistic regression. The coe cients show if a specific
group is more or less likely to have technocratic values as compared to the reference group.
In this case, we see that there is a smaller likelihood that individuals with higher levels of
education show support for the rule by experts. Column (1) presents the logistic coe cient
of education on technocratic attitudes. The coe cient is seen to be negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level. Since the size of the coe cients are hard to interpret, we calculate
odd ratios for the coe cients and present them inside the square brackets underneath the
standard errors. In this case, our model predicts that the odds of having technocratic atti-
tudes decrease by almost 40% for a person from the highest group of education as compared
to a person from the lowest group. Column (2) includes our socioeconomic control variables:
income and occupation. Column (3) additionally controls for demographic variables. While
holding constant the control variables, the parameter estimates for education remain nega-
tive and significant. Column (4) finally adds the attitudinal control variable to our model.
As we can see, and as predicted, the anti-democratic variable captures the e↵ect of education
to a large extent. The hypothesis that people with a lower level of education are more likely
to support the rule of experts because they have anti-democratic values is supported by the
data.
Table 5.2 shows the results of our ordinary least square regression studying the e↵ect of
education on the support for government by technique measured by our technocratic mental-
ity index. Column (1) shows the e↵ect of education on our technocratic index. We see that
when the level of education passes from lower (reference group) to higher, the predicted value
of our dependent variable falls by -0.185. That is, contrarily to what conventional wisdom
claims, individuals with lower, not higher levels of education show support for the contempo-
rary definition of technocracy. Column (2) additionally controls for income and occupation.
Income is also seen to have a negative and significant coe cient. As we can see, education
is far from being the only variable explaining variation in technocratic attitudes. Variables
accounting for the respondents’ socioeconomic background (including education) account for
12% of the variation of the dependent variable. Column (3) adds the demographic control
28
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Table 5.1: Education and Support for Rule by Experts (Logistic regression)
Dependent variable:
Support for the rule by experts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[Ref. Education lower] - - - -
Education Middle  0.168⇤⇤⇤  0.080⇤⇤⇤  0.108⇤⇤⇤  0.041
(0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030)
[0.846] [0.923] [0.898] [0.960]
Education Upper  0.494⇤⇤⇤  0.323⇤⇤⇤  0.257⇤⇤⇤  0.067⇤
(0.023) (0.032) (0.035) (0.037)
[0.610] [0.724] [0.773] [0.935]
[Ref. Income Lower] - - -
Income Middle  0.063⇤⇤  0.075⇤⇤⇤  0.013
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028)
[0.939] [0.928] [0.987]
Income Higher  0.267⇤⇤⇤  0.125⇤⇤⇤  0.048
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032)
[0.766] [0.882] [0.953]
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Female 0.103⇤⇤⇤ 0.108⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.024)
[1.109] [1.114]
Age  0.007⇤⇤⇤  0.007⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
[0.993] [0.993]
Wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good  0.352⇤⇤⇤
(0.051)
[0.703]
Strong leader bad  1.314⇤⇤⇤
(0.049)
[0.269]
Strong leader very bad  1.811⇤⇤⇤
(0.049)
[0.163]
Observations 56,767 39,998 39,937 38,962
Log Likelihood -39,361.640 -27,695.560 -26,381.510 -24,248.520
Akaike Inf. Crit. 78,729.280 55,427.130 52,853.030 48,593.050
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 5.2: Education and Support for Government by Technique (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Support for government by technique (Index 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[Ref. Education Lower] - - - -
Education Middle  0.109⇤⇤⇤  0.073⇤⇤⇤  0.060⇤⇤⇤  0.055⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education Upper  0.185⇤⇤⇤  0.131⇤⇤⇤  0.105⇤⇤⇤  0.095⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
[Ref. Income Lower] - - -
Income Middle  0.014⇤⇤⇤  0.016⇤⇤⇤  0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Income Higher  0.050⇤⇤⇤  0.025⇤⇤⇤  0.023⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Female 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002)
Age  0.0004⇤⇤⇤  0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good  0.010⇤⇤
(0.005)
Strong leader bad  0.036⇤⇤⇤
(0.004)
Strong leader very bad  0.066⇤⇤⇤
(0.004)
Observations 69,604 47,759 47,682 40,293
R2 0.080 0.122 0.224 0.221
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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variables. The e↵ect of education remains negative and significant while controlling for all
other variables such as country, age, gender and wave1. Although the e↵ect appears to be
smaller when controlling for other variables, it remains substantial and significant2. Finally,
column (4) adds the anti-democratic attitudinal variable. Although anti-democratic values
a↵ect technocratic mentality, the e↵ect of education remains significant while controlling
for this variable indicating a direct e↵ect of education on the support for government by
technique, independently of the anti-democratic variable.
Di↵erent chains of reasoning are needed to explain the relationship between education
and the two di↵erent definitions of technocratic attitudes. While the support for the rule by
experts can be explained by the respondents’ anti-democratic values, the support for gov-
ernment by technique seems to demonstrate a direct relationship with the level of education.
The relationship between education and anti-democratic values has been extensively studied
in previous research. The relationship which requires our attention in this case is the one
between education and government by technique. Is it really to be expected that people
with lower levels of education show a stronger support for government by technique? We
will examine this relationship further in our discussion.
Although this is an individual-data level study, it might be interesting to see whether
or not our results are reflected at an aggregate level. Figure 5.1 shows the average scores
on the technocratic mentality index in the OECD countries3. When regressing the Human
Development Index on the technocratic index we obtain a coe cient of -0.893 significant at
the 1% level4. In other words, factors such as income and education are negatively associated
to the support for government by technique both at the individual and the aggregate level.
Although the aggregate comparative study opens up new avenues of research interest, for
example the e↵ect of dictatorships on technocratic attitudes, these themes will not be studied
here.
5.2 Explaining political behaviour
In this second part of our empirical section our (until now) dependent variables will be used
as independent variables in order to predict political behaviour such as party preferences and
voting abstention. We begin by looking at what we call the ideological party preferences of
the respondents by using least square estimations.
Table 5.3 shows the association between the support for the rule of experts and the rile
index. The rile index takes on values between -1 and 1 where -1 represents extreme left wing
and 1 extreme right wing. Column (1) shows negative regression coe cients, however this
e↵ect disappears once we control for other explanatory variables. In other words, the ‘net’
e↵ect of our first definition of technocratic attitudes, (the support for rule by experts) on
1It is interesting to note that both age and gender also seem to a↵ect technocratic attitudes. According
to our model, women are more technocratic, so are young people.
2It is important to keep in mind that we cannot compare the coe cients across the various specifications
in a precise manner since the number of observations varies in the di↵erent models.
3A close up map of Europe is available in the appendix C.
4See the appendix C for aggregate results.
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Figure 5.1: Technocratic attitudes in the OECD countries
ideological party preference appears to be irrelevant, in accordance with our hypothesis.
In table 5.4 which looks at our technocratic mentality index the e↵ect on our dependent
variable is also shown to be negative at first. However, when controlling for other variables
the coe cient becomes positive and significant. That is, the e↵ect of technocratic attitudes
on party preferences is positive and significant when controlling for all other variables in the
model. A positive relationship indicates that more technocratic mentality leads to a stronger
right-wing preference. We decide to express the index in a scale of 0-10 to better interpret
the results. Column (4) shows that when our technocratic index increases by one unit, the
predicted value of the rile index approximately increases by 0.01. The values predicted by
Index 2 are larger5. Here an unit’s increase in technocratic attitudes (expressed in a scale from
0-10) is associated with an increase of almost 0.04 in the rile index. What do these results
really tell us? To better illustrate the meaning of our results, we give a practical example.
Sweden has an avarage score of 3.1 on the technocratic mentality index (when expressed as
a scale from 0-10). Spain has an avarage of 5.7. The di↵erence is 2.6. An increase of 2.6
points on the technocratic mentality scale (index 2) would imply an increase of 0.104 on the
rile index. This approximately corresponds to passing from supporting the Spanish party:
Izquierda Unida (left wing) to supporting the Spanish party: Partido Socialista Obrero
Espan˜ol (moderate left wing). If this is a big or a small e↵ect is a subjective judgment.
In summary, as our hypotheses predicted, there is no significant relationship between
ideological party preference and technocratic attitudes when referring to the support for
the rule by experts, but there is a significant relationship between technocratic attitudes
understood as the government by technique and ideological party preference. However,
5see results in Appendix table?
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Table 5.3: Support for Rule by Experts and Ideological Party Preference (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Ideological Party Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[Ref. Rule by experts very good] - - - -
Rule by experts fairly good  0.004 0.008 0.028⇤ 0.022
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Rule by experts fairly bad  0.033⇤⇤  0.008 0.005  0.0002
(0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
Rule by experts very bad  0.025⇤  0.005 0.005 0.008
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018)
Age 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Female  0.036⇤⇤⇤  0.035⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
[Ref. Education Lower] - -
Education Middle  0.019  0.020
(0.013) (0.013)
Education Upper  0.066⇤⇤⇤  0.065⇤⇤⇤
(0.015) (0.015)
[Ref. Income Lower] - -
Income Middle 0.057⇤⇤⇤ 0.056⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011)
Income Higher 0.116⇤⇤⇤ 0.117⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.012)
Occupation Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good 0.035
(0.024)
Strong leader bad 0.033
(0.023)
Strong leader very bad 0.014
(0.023)
Observations 10,319 10,286 6,257 6,174
R2 0.001 0.214 0.238 0.240
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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the R-square statistic shows that our independent variable only accounts for a very small
variation in the dependent variable. In fact it is so small we avoid drawing any definite
conclusions from the result.
Table 5.4: Support for Government by Technique and Ideological Party Preference (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Ideological Party Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index 1 (0-10) -0.0048⇤⇤⇤ 0.0081⇤⇤⇤ 0.0097⇤⇤⇤ 0.0107⇤⇤⇤
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Age 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Female  0.032⇤⇤⇤  0.029⇤⇤⇤  0.037⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
[Ref. Education Lower] - -
Education Middle  0.021⇤  0.019
(0.012) (0.013)
Education Upper  0.059⇤⇤⇤  0.059⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015)
[Ref. Income Lower] - -
Income Middle 0.060⇤⇤⇤ 0.061⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011)
Income Higher 0.118⇤⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.012)
Occupation Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good 0.041⇤
(0.023)
Strong leader bad 0.043⇤
(0.022)
Strong leader very bad 0.026
(0.022)
Observations 11,945 11,905 7,035 6,285
R2 0.001 0.229 0.252 0.242
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Table 5.5 shows the relationship between technocratic attitudes understood as the sup-
port for the rule by experts and voting abstention. In this case we use maximum likelihood
estimations. The coe cients show whether the likelihood that a group abstains from par-
ticipating in elections is smaller or bigger as compared to the reference group. In this case
we see what seems to be a non-linear relationship. In column (1) we see that the likeliness
is lowest among individuals who consider that technocracy is ‘fairly bad’ (the odds of voting
decreases by more than 40%), but surprisingly increases again among people who consider
technocracy to be ‘very bad’. Column (2) adds demographic control variables and column
(3) adds socioeconomic control variables. The relationship stays very much the same when
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controlling for other factors. When adding our final control variable in column (4) however,
the relationship looses significance in all but one category. This may indicate that, as hy-
pothesized, the higher probabilities of abstention among supporters of the rule by experts is
explained primarily by their low support for democracy in general.
Table 5.5: Support for the Rule by Experts and Abstention (Logistic regression)
Dependent variable:
Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[Ref. Rule by experts very good] - - - -
Rule by experts fairly good  0.249⇤⇤⇤  0.270⇤⇤⇤  0.308⇤⇤  0.182
(0.090) (0.095) (0.124) (0.133)
[0.780] [0.763] [0.735] [0.834]
Rule by experts fairly bad  0.537⇤⇤⇤  0.470⇤⇤⇤  0.616⇤⇤⇤  0.482⇤⇤⇤
(0.099) (0.106) (0.145) (0.157)
[0.584] [0.625] [0.540] [0.618]
Rule by experts very bad  0.338⇤⇤⇤  0.312⇤⇤⇤  0.402⇤⇤  0.254
(0.110) (0.119) (0.172) (0.187)
[0.713] [0.732] [0.669] [0.776]
Female 0.092 0.039 0.042
(0.065) (0.099) (0.101)
[1.097] [1.040] [1.043]
Age  0.009⇤⇤⇤  0.012⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
[0.991] [0.988] [0.986]
Wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
[Ref. Education lower] - -
Education Middle 0.121 0.165
(0.115) (0.117)
[1.129] [1.180]
Education Upper 0.194 0.250
(0.157) (0.159)
[1.214] [1.284]
[Ref. Income lower] - -
Income Middle  0.141  0.135
(0.108) (0.110)
[0.868] [0.874]
Income Higher  0.317⇤⇤  0.351⇤⇤
(0.154) (0.156)
[0.728] [0.704]
Occupation Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader fairly good] -
Strong leader fairly good  0.455⇤⇤⇤
(0.166)
[0.634]
Strong leader bad  0.407⇤⇤
(0.169)
[0.666]
Strong leader very bad  0.430⇤⇤
(0.173)
[0.651]
Observations 58,394 58,244 39,937 38,962
Log Likelihood  5,296.275  3,908.784  2,010.329  1,951.262
Akaike Inf. Crit. 10,600.550 7,881.568 4,116.659 4,004.525
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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When studying the e↵ect of government by technique on abstention in table 5.6 we see
that individuals with a higher score on the technocratic mentality index are more likely to
abstain from participating in elections. In column (1) we see that when the technocratic
index, expressed in a scale from 0-10 increases by one unit, the odds of abstaining increase
by almost 20%. This result di↵ers from our prediction made in the previous chapter. Adding
additional controls does not a↵ect the relationship in any appreciable manner. When adding
our final control variable in column (4) we see that the support for government by technique
holds a direct relationship with political abstention independently of anti-democratic values.
That is, the higher probabilities of abstention among individuals who support government
by technique cannot only be explained by the disrespect for democracy. We will analyse
this more carefully in our discussion. Finally, a surprising result is that education is seen
to positivly a↵ect abstention. There is a big consensus in the academic community that
education holds a negative relationship to abstention; more educated people abstain less.
When running a binary regression between education and abstention we indeed see a negative
relationship between the two variables. However, adding control variables such as gender,
occupation or country fixed e↵ects to the model a↵ects the coe cient, reducing the e↵ect
or making the coe cient change signs. We will look more carefully at this unexpected
relationship in our discussion.
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Table 5.6: Support for Government by Technique and Abstention (Logistic regression)
Dependent variable:
Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index 1 (0-10) 0.1834⇤⇤⇤ 0.1354⇤⇤⇤ 0.1180⇤⇤⇤ 0.1525⇤⇤⇤
(0.0098) (0.0117) (0.0179) (0.0207)
[1.201] [1.145] [1.125] [1.165]
Female  0.012  0.0003  0.020
(0.054) (0.089) (0.100)
[0.988] [0.999] [0.980]
Age  0.012⇤⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤⇤  0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
[Ref. Education lower] - -
Education Middle 0.328⇤⇤⇤ 0.301⇤⇤⇤
(0.103) (0.117)
[1.388] [1.351]
Education Upper 0.497⇤⇤⇤ 0.475⇤⇤⇤
(0.142) (0.159)
[1.644] [1.608]
[Ref. Income lower] - -
Income Middle  0.083  0.112
(0.093) (0.108)
[0.920] [0.894]
Income Higher  0.430⇤⇤⇤  0.346⇤⇤
(0.145) (0.156)
[0.651] [0.708]
Occupation Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good  0.521⇤⇤⇤
(0.159)
[0.594]
Strong leader bad  0.454⇤⇤⇤
(0.156)
[0.635]
Strong leader very bad  0.401⇤⇤
(0.161)
[0.670]
Observations 87,266 80,572 47,682 40,293
Log Likelihood  7,692.793  5,732.081  2,614.934  1,989.996
Akaike Inf. Crit. 15,389.590 11,530.160 5,327.868 4,077.992
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Chapter 6
Discussion
A few fundamental questions arise out of the empirical results presented in chapter 5. Al-
though our hypotheses regarding the support for the rule by experts were confirmed by the
data, more questions arise when studying the support for government by technique. When
looking at the relationship between education and technocratic attitudes we asked ourselves,
is it credible that the least educated are the strongest supporters for government by tech-
nique? In our first section of this chapter we will further discuss the possible mechanisms
through which knowledge and technocratic attitudes understood as the support for govern-
ment by technique might be channelled. When looking at how technocratic attitudes a↵ect
political behaviour we wondered what might be the link between technocratic attitudes and
abstention? Consequently, we will study the relationship between technocracy and political
participation in the second section of our discussion.
6.1 Technocracy, power and social control
If you don’t want a man unhappy politically, don’t give him two sides to
a question to worry him; give him one. Better yet, give him none.
— Beatty, Fahrenheit 451
Technocracy understood as the government by technique systematically excludes people lack-
ing expertise from the political process. According to Laird, technocracy means the ‘disen-
franchisement of citizens’. He argues that when debate is structured in technical terms
“citizens who are not technical specialists simply have nothing to contribute, even if they
have a strong interest in the issue. The debate will be dominated by institutions that can
a↵ord such expertise” (Laird, 1990:53). Ribbhagen (2013:16) identifies a similar pattern
commenting that “a policy issue or process that is technocratically framed is likely to dis-
empower those lacking information and expertise within the area while supplying those with
information and expertise with a ‘technocratic key’ leading to the door of political power”.
Williams (2006) distinguishes between a governance dimension and a programmatic dimen-
sion of technocracy. From the point of view of a governance dimension, it is probable that
the ones who lose the greatest amount of political power and influence are the least edu-
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cated individuals in society. The gate of access to e↵ective political participation remains
closed to those lacking expert knowledge themselves, and lacking means to obtain expert
knowledge from intermediaries. The programmatic dimension “consists of the neoliberal
market reforms that technocratic practitioners institute” (Williams, 2006:120). Policies that
favour capital over labour harm the most vulnerable in society, such as the least educated.
A blogger from the economist writes: “technocrats may be good at saying how much pain
a country must endure, how to make its debt level sustainable or how to solve a financial
crisis. But they are not so good at working out how pain is to be distributed”1. We can
identify two processes through which less educated citizens lose power inside a technocratic
paradigm: (1) Since they are not experts themselves, and since they most probably don’t
have the means to access expert knowledge, they cannot question the facts that are pre-
sented to them. For example, if a famous politician claims that it is scientifically proven that
reducing deficit and cutting social spending are the only ways to regain economic growth,
a person with no knowledge on the subject cannot contest this, because he does not have
the knowledge to argue otherwise. (2) If debate is framed in a technocratic manner, value
judgments which might otherwise be considered important are trivialized since they belong
to a ‘inferior’ group of knowledge. For example, if government explains that a nuclear power
plant is the most e cient way of generating energy and therefore the optimal policy option,
it can be di cult for the local population to express resistance, since their opinions and
value judgments are deemed less important. By discarding normative arguments of social
justice, the technocratic paradigm appears to work against the very same people who have
been identified as its strongest supporters. How can this be? Why would the least educated
support technocratic decision-making if they are the ones who benefit from it the least?
According to Fischer: “numerous authors have identified a subtle, apolitical form of
authoritarianism in this technocratic strategy. When expert solutions are legitimized as
rational, e cient, and enlightened, it is not so easy for the unwilling recipients to resist their
applications” (Fischer, 2000:18). The fact that some knowledge is classified as ‘superior’
makes it extremely di cult for laypeople to argue or question arguments presented to them
in technocratic terms. People with less education are very possibly more inclined to accept
what the possessors of knowledge claim to be true, since they lack any kind of tools to attack
these claims. Fischer talks of ‘counter-expertise’. When one scientifically proven assumption
is proved wrong by other scientifically proven assumptions, the unreliability of scientific
knowledge reveals itself and it becomes easier to bring back the discussion to the political
sphere. People with little education however are incapable of producing counter-expertise
and cannot battle with allegedly ‘objective truths’.
Perhaps we must analyse technocracy as en exercise of power in order to shed light
on the complex relationship between knowledge and technocratic support. The writing of
Foucault (1980) greatly contribute to this discussion by describing the intimate relationship
between power and knowledge. According to Foucault this relationship is not unidirectional.
Although knowledge creates and sustains relationships of power, power also produces knowl-
1http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/11/technocrats-and-democracy
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edge. That is, power produces e↵ects of truth by determining what counts as knowledge.
Flyvbjerg (1998) summarizes the relationship as follows:
Power concerns itself with defining reality rather than with discovering what reality “really”
is [...] this is not to imply that power seeks out rationality and knowledge because rationality
and knowledge are power. Rather, power defines what counts as rationality and knowledge and
thereby what counts as reality (Flyvbjerg, 1998:319).
When referring to technocracy, expert knowledge does not only permit certain elites to
occupy powerful positions, this same system of elites and institutions create knowledge, by
defining what can be considered as such. By shaping opinion on what kind of knowledge is
accepted, technocratic discourse shapes our perception on what methods and what criteria
for decision-making are deemed relevant and important. Power is not power for having
discovered objective truth. Power shapes the way we understand truth.
Foucault’s view of power fits into our conception of government by technique. We are
not referring to a powerful rule of elites which openly dominates and represses. In fact, the
exercise of power should not be attributed to one specific set of actors. Rather power is cap-
illary: it is structural, relational and can be found in the very discourse which gently moulds
our perceptions of what reality is, and what knowledge should be. Lukes (2005) explains
that when power is not coercive, it needs compliance from willing subjects. What we see in
our data is a strict compliance from those who benefit the least from current power relations.
The technocratic paradigm thus produces ‘subjects’ among the least educated in society by
convincing them that the determined knowledge is objective and neutral. There is a certain
component of ‘instrumentality’ in Foucault’s view of power. The compliance of subjects not
only represses, but produces. In our case, the compliance of those who least benefit from
technocratic policy-making assures the functionality of the capitalist system increasing the
productive potential of society. Herbert Marcuse (1964) describes a one-dimensional society
where “domination is transfigured into administration” (Marcuse, 1964:32) and where peo-
ple become alienated and blind to apparent conflicts of interests since their false, material
needs are fulfilled by the increased consumption of luxury products to the benefit of the
capitalist system. The domination of technocratic reasoning thus functions as a manner of
social control, aimed at easing economic productivity. Excluding alternative modes of rea-
soning from the regime of truth limits critical thinking and political debate. As Bradbury so
meritoriously describes in his book Fahrenheit 451, a man who is only shown one side of the
story will be less likely to detect potential conflicts of interest and therefore be more willing
to comply.
Viewing technocracy as an exercise of power helps us understand how the system assures
the compliance of those who are being dominated in the existing power relationships. One
might still ask why this conflict of interest is not more often commented upon. Lukes de-
scribes this kind of situation as a latent conflict. A latent conflict implies a “contradiction
between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude”
(Lukes, 2005:28). Although there is a potential conflict of real interests between the ‘tech-
nostructure’ and the normal citizen, this conflict is not generally observed since there is no
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conflict of subjective interests. For example, technocratic discourse talks about the common
good, when what is good for some is not necessarily good for everyone. For example, every-
body talks about the imperativeness of economic growth, but few discuss whether growth
will really benefit everyone: “specifically, planners and managers blur the distinction between
the worlds of economic production and social interaction, thus making it di cult for many
to distinguish between the priorities of the economic system and those of their own lives”
(Fischer, 1990:47). Subsequently, technocracy should not be understood as a 1-dimensional
exercise of power where domination is apparent and conflict overt, where the dominated
upon are obliged to do what the dominator wants. Technocracy should be understood as
an exercise of 3-dimensional power. Structures create (not necessarily consciously) a context
where the technocratic mode of reasoning is considered more ‘valid’ than alternative modes
of reasoning. Centeno resumes:
We could speak of ideological battle as a struggle over answers (1-dimensional) or at most
over questions (2-dimensional). Technocracies focus on the much more important struggle over
the methods to determine the validity of answers and questions (3-dimensional). This third
dimension encompasses a faith in the applicability and superiority of professional and technical
methodologies and paradigms (Centeno, 1993:313).
In summary, a possible theory which would explain what we see in the data is that less
educated people possess less tools in order to question the facts that powerful institutions
present as true. The incapacity of producing counter-expertise and to bring back the tech-
nocratic discussion to a political level makes them more inclined to accept their a rmations.
Since the resulting conflict of interests is latent, there is little resistance to existing power
relations.
6.2 Technocratic attitudes and vote incentives
When studying the e↵ect of technocratic attitudes understood as the support for government
by technique on abstention, our results show a direct relationship between these two variables
independently of anti-democratic values. That is, the low turnout among this group is not
necessarily explained by the disregard for the democratic ideal. Why then choose not to
participate in democratic governance? Support for the democratic system is clearly not the
only variable explaining electoral participation and on further examination, our hypothesis
regarding the voting behaviour of individuals with technocratic attitudes (H7) was rather uni-
dimensional. Many factors might explain the higher probabilities of abstaining from voting
among people with these particular attitudes. For example, a person with technocratic values
probably wants to live inside a democratic system, but does not get much satisfaction from
participating himself.
In the previous section we took on a theoretical approach when trying to explain why
less educated people support technocratic decision-making. We discussed that the support
for the technocratic policy-paradigm could be viewed as a form of compliance of willing
subjects to determined power relations. Keeping to one’s own business and letting others
CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 42
decide could also be a sign of such compliance. After all, politically active members of the
public are seen as worrisome threats to the agendas of some political and corporate elites
(Fischer, 1990:28). From this point of view one could argue that the ‘system’ which benefits
from technocratic decision-making also manipulates the way we think about democracy,
overemphasising the assurance of negative liberties, ignoring the democratic requirement of
positive liberties such as self-governance through participation. In this section however we
will put aside the theoretical discussion on power relationships and explore whether or not
voting abstention could be considered rational behaviour. Many researchers have studied the
idea that abstention might be a rational choice for individuals who take into account the
costs and benefits of voting.
When presenting our results in the previous chapter, we noticed that education had a
positive e↵ect on voting abstention. We considered this enigmatic since education if often
claimed to hold a negative relationship with voting abstention (Wolfinger and Rosenstone,
1980). This ‘strange’ relationship makes us wonder whether the e↵ect of education on absten-
tion might in fact be di↵erent for people with and without technocratic attitudes. In view
of this, in this final section of our discussion, we wish to analyse (1) why people with tech-
nocratic attitudes abstain and (2) whether the e↵ect of education on abstention is di↵erent
for people with and without technocratic attitudes.
Education is often related to the amount of information an individual has when it comes
to voting. It is probable that an educated person follows political news to a larger extent and
processes political messages more e↵ectively. An existing theory describing the link between
abstention and ‘asymmetrical information’ is the one presented by Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996) in their article ‘The Swing Voter’s Curse’. These authors claim that there are two
kinds of voters: partisans and independents. Independent voters have higher probabilities
to a↵ect the outcome of elections seeing that the support from swing voters often ends up
to be crucial for a parties electoral victory. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) argue that
independent voters who have little information about the quality of policy proposals tend to
abstain from participating in elections out of rational calculation. Since independent voters
are more likely to determine the outcome of elections than partisan voters, the strategic
thing to do for an independent voter who has little information would be to abstain from
participating in elections seeing that: “abstention is an optimal strategy because it maximizes
the probability that the informed voters decide the elections” (Feddersen and Pesendorfer,
1996). Abstention in these circumstances has to be understood as a kind of ‘passive vote’.
The abstainer cares about the outcomes of elections but chooses to delegate his vote to those
who are better informed, thus increasing their chances of determining the election outcomes.
According to this chain of thought, the least informed independent voters delegate their
vote via abstention to voters who are more informed as to which is the best option in view
of the circumstances and the political proposals in question. ‘Partisan’ voters, however,
vote out of habit and ideological commitment, more independently of education. This idea
of rationally delegating decision-making to the better informed is very much in tune with
a technocratic mode of reasoning. Those who know should decide, even inside a demo-
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cratic framework. One might therefore consider that the distinction between ‘partisan’ and
‘independent’ voters could be translated into the distinction between ‘technocratic’ and ‘non-
technocratic’ voters. If we assume that most technocratic voters are independent voters, the
theory of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) would predict that, not only should people with
technocratic attitudes abstain more, but the e↵ect of education on abstention should be larger
for people with technocratic attitudes, seeing that independent voters with less information
vote even less than partisan voters with little information.
Nevertheless, some factors make us believe that the distinction between ‘partisan’ and
‘independent’ voters isn’t the right distinction to make in this case. An independent voter
could very well support pluralistic modes of decision making, and a person with technocratic
attitudes may vote quite automatically for a specific party. As we saw in our previous
chapter, people with technocratic attitudes tend to favour right-wing parties. Instead, we
choose to distinguish between (1) technocratic voters and (2) pluralistic voters. We argue
that a technocratic voter would be a person who only cares about the outcomes of elections.
He cares about what policies are at stake and is concerned that the most e cient ones should
be implemented. He does not care about participating for the sake of participating. If his
vote is not pivotal, participating is meaningless. A pluralistic voter on the other hand is the
absolute opposite of a technocratic voter. It is a person who greatly values the opportunity of
participating and considers that voting is crucial for the quality of democracy. The outcome
of the elections is secondary to the act of participating.
In view of this we present an alternative theory as to why people with technocratic atti-
tudes abstain and how education a↵ects abstention di↵erently for technocratic and pluralistic
voters. While Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) assumed that there are no costs involved
when making the decision to vote, we will assume that costs such as weather, motivation
and opportunity costs all influence the decision to vote. In view of these costs, Downs (1957)
presented his famous theory in the book An Economic Theory of Democracy arguing that
it is fundamentally irrational to vote. Since the costs of voting will always be higher than
the possibility to actually a↵ect the outcomes of the elections, rational individuals should
be expected to abstain from voting. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) solved the ‘paradox of not
voting’ by explaining that it is rational for people to vote because there are more benefits
associated to participating than that of influencing election outcomes. Personal satisfaction
of fulfilling a civic duty for example adds a consumption benefit to the act of voting.
We argue that for people with technocratic attitudes, the additional instrumental benefit
from voting is inexistent. Rather, an individual with a technocratic mentality considers that
participating without the chance of influencing the outcome (which is what they care about)
is meaningless. The act of participating for its own sake doesn’t give them any additional
satisfaction. The utility to vote for a person with technocratic attitudes is therefore always
very low. For example, say U is the expected utility of voting for a person with technocratic
attitudes. B is the benefit associated to voting if the desired outcome occurs and P is the
probability that the individual’s vote will a↵ect the outcome. C represents the costs involved
in voting.
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UTA = (B ⇤ P )  C (6.1)
Since P will always be 0 or close to 0, it is irrational for the technocratic individual to vote.
That is, the abstention of individuals with technocratic attitudes can be explained by the
fact that they only consider it rational to participate if they in fact have a chance to influence
the outcomes. On the other hand, for a person with pluralistic attitudes (PA), participation
is what gives democracy meaning. When voting, their main purpose for doing so is their
satisfaction of participating in the joint plural decision-making process and fulfilling their
civic duty as democratic citizens: “they seem to value being an active chooser independently
of the outcomes of the collective choice” (Przeworski, 2010:14). We therefore add a parameter
D in our formula indicating the emotional, instrumental benefits associated to participating.
UPA = (B ⇤ P )  C +D (6.2)
In view of these benefits, it should be much more probable that a pluralistic voter par-
ticipates, than a technocratic voter, since the pluralistic voter associates more benefits to
the act of voting. Furthermore, it is highly probable that, for a pluralistic voter, the instru-
mental benefit associated with voting grows the more education the individual has obtained.
Many authors have commented that civic virtues and the preoccupation for the public good
are positively a↵ected by education (Almond and Verba, 1963). We therefore interact the
instrumental benefit D with education thus obtaining a greater e↵ect of D when education
is higher.
UPA = (B ⇤ P )  C +D + (D ⇤ education) (6.3)
If these assumptions are correct, we would expect that not only do people with techno-
cratic attitudes abstain more, but the e↵ect of education on abstention should have a smaller
e↵ect on this group. Perhaps the relationship is more easily expressed in terms of pluralis-
tic attitudes. People with pluralistic attitudes are expected to abstain less and the e↵ect of
education on abstention should have a stronger (negative) e↵ect for this group. In order to
check whether pluralistic voters abstain less and whether education has a stronger e↵ect on
abstention for people with pluralistic attitudes we run an interactive regression which shows
the conditional e↵ect of pluralistic attitudes on the relationship between education and ab-
stention. In order to get a scale of pluralistic attitudes, we simply reverse the technocratic
index2.
The results in table 6.1 support our hypothesis and at the same time show that the
theory of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) isn’t applicable in our case. In column (3) we
see that although technocratic voters abstain to a larger extent than pluralistic voters, the
e↵ect of education is smaller for people with technocratic attitudes since they are more likely
to abstain independently of education. For a person with pluralistic values, the e↵ect of
2We choose to present the results in terms of pluralistic attitudes simply because the results are more easy
to interpret. The regression using the traditional technocratic index can be found in the appendix C. The
index is expressed in a scale of 0-1.
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Table 6.1: Pluralistic Attitudes, Education and Abstention (Interactive Logistic Regression)
Dependent variable:
Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pluralistic index  1.834⇤⇤⇤  1.292⇤⇤⇤  0.723⇤⇤
(0.098) (0.158) (0.306)
Education Middle  0.530⇤⇤⇤  0.055 0.881⇤⇤⇤
(0.061) (0.128) (0.225)
Education Upper  0.853⇤⇤⇤ 0.345⇤ 1.144⇤⇤⇤
(0.082) (0.182) (0.312)
Controls No Yes
Pluralistic index* Education Middle  0.652⇤⇤⇤  1.352⇤⇤⇤
(0.248) (0.437)
Pluralistic index* Education Upper  1.714⇤⇤⇤  1.452⇤⇤⇤
(0.335) (0.547)
Observations 87,266 69,607 69,604 40,293
Log Likelihood  7,692.793  6,449.783  6,312.976  1,983.247
Akaike Inf. Crit. 15,389.590 12,905.570 12,637.950 4,068.494
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
education increases with the associated benefits of voting. Figure 6.1 shows the marginal
e↵ects of pluralistic attitudes and education on abstention. The graph clearly illustrates that,
as predicted, the probability of abstention decreases most steeply for people with pluralistic
attitudes and upper levels of education. When adding our control variables3 in column (4)
the e↵ect of education remains strong and negative for people with pluralistic attitudes.
However, the e↵ect of education on people with technocratic attitudes is also shown to be
significant and strong, but positive. Why would higher levels of education lead to higher
levels of abstention for people with technocratic attitudes? A possible explanation could be
that people with technocratic attitudes and higher levels of education are more rational, and
therefore more easily observe the irrationality of their participation.
3The controls include income, occupation, age, gender, country and wave fixed e↵ects and anti-democratic
values.
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Figure 6.1: Pluralistic attitudes, education and abstention
Chapter 7
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to study technocratic attitudes. More specifically, our
objectives were to examine the relationship between (1) education and technocratic attitudes,
(2) technocratic attitudes and political behaviour and finally (3) to comment on the empirical
di↵erence between our two definitions of technocratic attitudes. Our findings can be summed
up as follows:
1. Lower levels of education are associated to stronger support for the rule by experts.
This relationship is in turn explained by the strong link between technocratic attitudes
and anti-democratic values.
2. Lower levels of education directly lead to stronger support for government by technique.
We argue that the incapacity to question what is presented as ‘true’ and the inability
to produce counter-expertise explains this relationship.
3. The support for the rule by experts is not associated to any specific ideological party
preference.
4. The support for government by technique is associated to the preference for right-
wing parties. The fact that right-wing parties use technocratic discourse as a form of
legitimization and substantiation explains this relationship.
5. The support for the rule by experts leads to higher probabilities of voting abstention.
The relationship is explained by low support for democracy among this group.
6. The support for government by technique leads to higher probabilities of voting ab-
stention independently of anti-democratic values. We argue that this might be so since
technocratic voters mostly care about the outcomes of elections and thus have small
incentives to vote.
We believe that this study has shed some light on who the supporters of technocratic
decision-making are, and how they behave politically. As we have argued earlier, technocracy
should not only be studied by looking at decision-making processes or institutional arrange-
ments, but by examining technocracy at an individual level. What characterizes technocratic
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governance is not merely its institutions, but the values and attitudes of the people who sup-
port them. Contrarily to what conventional wisdom claims, technocratic mentality is more
common among people with low levels of education. This does not, however, mean that they
are the ones who benefit from this decision-making paradigm.
The wish to study so many relationships in one paper has perhaps weakened the quality
of the theoretical arguments justifying and explaining causal mechanisms. We have however
made a serious e↵ort (mainly in our discussion) to give answers and not only descriptions.
Future studies my wish to approach the subject above all with more sophisticated tools for
confronting the endogeneity problems from which this study su↵ers. Nevertheless, our aim
was never to establish positive uni-causal relationships. In a way, it seems correct that this
paper should serve more as a source of inspiration for future studies, than as a means to
prove the validity of determined hypotheses; we have, after all dedicated numerous pages of
this paper to discussing the limits of science.
In this paper we have studied technocratic attitudes understood as the support for the
rule by experts and government by technique in a static sense. From this point of view there
is a clear theoretical and empirical distinction between the two definitions. However, future
research may wish to approach technocracy in a more dynamic sense. The use of technical
methods in politics may, in time lead to structural rearrangements where political parties
end up dominated by experts. The continued study of the transformation and characteristics
of political elites would be of great interest in order to study up to what point the two
definitions of technocracy might be converging over time. It is important to keep in mind
that a convergence of the two concepts in modern day societies inevitably would imply
the introduction of undemocratic political structures in what we believe to be democratic
societies.
This paper has studied the contrasts between scientific and political approaches to policy-
making. During the course of the paper we have taken on a scientific approach, attempting
to be neutral when examining our empirical data and using statistical tools in order to detect
tendencies and make generalizations. Since science has been given such protagonism in our
methodological approximation, it would seem almost ‘unfair’ not to give our political mode of
reasoning a chance to make some value judgments. In this paper we have commented many
times that government by technique is compatible with representative democracy. How-
ever, our expressed opinion is that contemporary technocracy may be extremely harmful
to the quality of democracy. Government by technique fundamentally means the neglect
of normative reasoning in politics. The substance of politics is ignored and overridden by
a one-dimensional discourse where “governance becomes less a matter of determining the
appropriate direction for society than one of adjusting its institutions and policies to the
flows of economic and technological development” (Fischer, 1990:16). By ignoring that there
exist di↵erent, sometimes incompatible world-views, technocratic practitioners impose their
world-view on the rest of society, using a scientific and complex language to shield them
from opposition from below. Technocratic reasoning thus depoliticizes politics, by demer-
iting normative arguments and politicizes expertise by using scientific discourse to advance
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specific interests. By focusing on the best means for policy “the essential political question
- production of what? - is at best relegated to secondary status” (Fischer, 1990:24). Casting
political issues in technical terms ultimately leads to the reduced power and ability of citizens
to exercise self-governance. All in all, in a technocratic decision-making paradigm, citizens
have less to say and less alternatives to consider: “in a nutshell, the crisis of normative
neglect is truly a fundamental crises of democracy”(Fischer, 1990:49).
In view of this, we believe that perhaps the real ‘threat’ to democracy comes from within
democracy. Subtle tendencies are leading societies toward a place where elections are not
about choosing, but about formally legitimizing, and where politicians reject responsibility
for policy outcomes since their decisions were based on (unaccountable) expert recommen-
dations. As a result, and in tune with other researchers such as Fischer (1990), Laird (1990)
and Ribbhagen (2013), we suggest that the focus of future research on technocracy should
concentrate on these new political dynamics. This paper contributes by explaining that the
people who presumably support representative democracy decide to abstain from participat-
ing in fundamental democratic procedures such as elections thus exacerbating the crisis of
democracy from within.
How could these negative e↵ects of technocratic decision-making be countered? Perhaps,
the negative e↵ects of technocratic reasoning must be tackled not by reducing the role of
expert knowledge in society, but by di↵using and democratizing knowledge. Expertise is
fundamental for good decision-making. Few would wish to abandon all economic evaluation
of programs or wish to make every decision solely on the basis of intuition or belief. How then
can we use expertise in a more democratic way? Fischer writes: “the policy sciences have
sought to develop methods and practices designed to settle rather than stimulate debate”
(Fischer, 1998). Perhaps this is the greatest problem concerning technocratic decision-making
today. Knowledge is used to escape debate about value-laden issues. Wouldn’t it be better if
expertise could be channelled in a way in which it could stimulate debate?. Dewey spoke of
changing the relationship between expert and citizen, having the experts interpret complex
issues in ways which facilitate citizen learning and empowerment (Dewey, 1927). The key to
more democratic, post-industrial societies perhaps lies in the development of mechanisms to
transform expertise into a tool for citizens, and not for powerful corporations. Knowledge,
used in the right way could thus improve public debate and democratize expertise. Whether
this is possible is not a question of science, but purely a matter of political will.
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Table A.1: Education and Support for Government by Technique (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Index 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[Ref. Education Lower] - - - -
Education Middle  0.060⇤⇤⇤  0.040⇤⇤⇤  0.032⇤⇤⇤  0.029⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Education Upper  0.101⇤⇤⇤  0.072⇤⇤⇤  0.058⇤⇤⇤  0.053⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[Ref. Income Lower] - - -
Income Middle  0.007⇤⇤⇤  0.007⇤⇤⇤  0.007⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income Higher  0.026⇤⇤⇤  0.010⇤⇤⇤  0.009⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Female 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Age  0.0001⇤⇤⇤  0.0002⇤⇤⇤
(0.00004) (0.00004)
Wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good 0.0002
(0.002)
Strong leader bad  0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.002)
Strong leader very bad  0.034⇤⇤⇤
(0.002)
Observations 69,604 47,759 47,682 40,293
R2 0.087 0.131 0.242 0.243
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A.2: Education and Support for Government by Technique (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Index 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[Ref. Education Lower] - - - -
Education Middle  0.118⇤⇤⇤  0.083⇤⇤⇤  0.058⇤⇤⇤  0.051⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Education Upper  0.178⇤⇤⇤  0.125⇤⇤⇤  0.087⇤⇤⇤  0.077⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
[Ref. Income Lower] - - -
Income Middle  0.024⇤⇤⇤  0.022⇤⇤⇤  0.020⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income Higher  0.058⇤⇤⇤  0.029⇤⇤⇤  0.025⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Female 0.004⇤⇤  0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.0003⇤⇤⇤ 0.0001⇤⇤
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good  0.029⇤⇤⇤
(0.004)
Strong leader bad  0.054⇤⇤⇤
(0.004)
Strong leader very bad  0.062⇤⇤⇤
(0.004)
Observations 69,604 47,759 47,682 40,293
R2 0.091 0.142 0.263 0.257
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A.3: Support for Government by Technique and Ideological Party Preference (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Ideological Party Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index 2 (0-10)  0.0011 0.0301⇤⇤⇤ 0.0355⇤⇤⇤ 0.0397⇤⇤⇤
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0040)
Female  0.033⇤⇤⇤  0.030⇤⇤⇤  0.038⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Age 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
[Ref. Education Lower] - -
Education Middle  0.016  0.014
(0.012) (0.013)
Education Upper  0.049⇤⇤⇤  0.050⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015)
[Ref. Income Lower] - -
Income Middle 0.060⇤⇤⇤ 0.060⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.011)
Income Higher 0.117⇤⇤⇤ 0.117⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.012)
Occupation Yes Yes
[Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good 0.038
(0.023)
Strong leader bad 0.044⇤⇤
(0.022)
Strong leader very bad 0.033
(0.022)
Observations 11,945 11,905 7,035 6,285
R2 0.00001 0.235 0.259 0.250
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A.4: Support for Government by Technique and Ideological Party Preference (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Ideological Party Preference
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index 3 (0-10)  0.0099⇤⇤⇤ 0.0047⇤⇤⇤ 0.0055⇤⇤ 0.0061⇤⇤
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0026)
Female  0.031⇤⇤⇤  0.028⇤⇤⇤  0.035⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Age 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
[Ref. Education Lower] - -
Education Middle  0.023⇤⇤  0.022⇤
(0.012) (0.013)
Education Upper  0.064⇤⇤⇤  0.063⇤⇤⇤
(0.014) (0.015)
[Ref. Income Lower] - -
Income Middle 0.059⇤⇤⇤ 0.059⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011)
Income Higher 0.117⇤⇤⇤ 0.118⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.012)
Occupation Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good 0.044⇤
(0.023)
Strong leader bad 0.042⇤
(0.022)
Strong leader very bad 0.022
(0.022)
Observations 11,945 11,905 7,035 6,285
R2 0.003 0.227 0.250 0.239
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A.5: Support for Government by Technique and Abstention (Logistic Regression)
Dependent variable:
Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index 2 (0-10) 0.4010⇤⇤⇤ 0.2871⇤⇤⇤ 0.2478⇤⇤⇤ 0.2978⇤⇤⇤
(0.0195) (0.0224) (0.0347) (0.0405)
Female  0.029  0.007  0.021
(0.054) (0.089) (0.100)
Age  0.012⇤⇤⇤  0.011⇤⇤⇤  0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
[Ref. Education Lower]    
Education Middle 0.345⇤⇤⇤ 0.308⇤⇤⇤
(0.104) (0.117)
Education Upper 0.517⇤⇤⇤ 0.479⇤⇤⇤
(0.143) (0.159)
[Ref. Income Lower]    
Income Middle  0.087  0.118
(0.093) (0.108)
Income Higher  0.442⇤⇤⇤  0.360⇤⇤
(0.145) (0.156)
Occupation Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good]  
Strong leader fairly good  0.534⇤⇤⇤
(0.159)
Strong leader bad  0.461⇤⇤⇤
(0.156)
Strong leader very bad  0.406⇤⇤
(0.161)
Observations 87,269 80,572 47,682 40,293
Log Likelihood  7,589.950  5,716.610  2,610.536  1,989.528
Akaike Inf. Crit. 15,183.900 11,499.220 5,319.072 4,077.056
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table A.6: Support for Government by Technique and Abstention (Logistic Regression)
Dependent variable:
Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index 3 (0-10) 0.2111⇤⇤⇤ 0.1800⇤⇤⇤ 0.1518⇤⇤⇤ 0.1860⇤⇤⇤
(0.0094) (0.0112) (0.0176) (0.0205)
Female  0.036  0.004  0.022
(0.054) (0.089) (0.100)
Age  0.013⇤⇤⇤  0.012⇤⇤⇤  0.015⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes
[Ref. Education Lower] - -
Education Middle 0.365⇤⇤⇤ 0.329⇤⇤⇤
(0.104) (0.117)
Education Upper 0.536⇤⇤⇤ 0.510⇤⇤⇤
(0.143) (0.160)
[Ref. Income Lower] - -
Income Middle  0.072  0.100
(0.094) (0.109)
Income Higher  0.406⇤⇤⇤  0.317⇤⇤
(0.145) (0.157)
Occupation Yes Yes
[Ref. Strong leader very good] -
Strong leader fairly good  0.480⇤⇤⇤
(0.160)
Strong leader bad  0.395⇤⇤
(0.157)
Strong leader very bad  0.380⇤⇤
(0.162)
Observations 87,266 80,572 47,682 40,293
Log Likelihood  7,628.973  5,673.573  2,599.038  1,976.055
Akaike Inf. Crit. 15,261.950 11,413.150 5,296.077 4,050.111
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table B.1: Support for rule by experts (E115)
Rule by Experts %
Very good 13.00
Fairly good 42.00
Fairly bad 30.00
Very bad 16.00
Table B.2: Ideological party preference (E179mod)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Ideological Party Preference 11,946  0.067 0.365  0.790 1.000
Table B.3: Abstention (E179abs)
Abstention
0 98.00
1 2.00
Table B.4: Technocratic mentality indexes
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Index 1 87,266 0.438 0.258 0.000 1.000
Index 2 87,269 0.672 0.134 0.233 1.000
Index 3 87,266 0.311 0.239 0.000 1.000
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Table B.5: Education level (X025R)
Education %
Lower 34.00
Middle 42.00
Upper 25.00
Table B.6: Income level (X047mod)
Income
Lower 36.00
Middle 39.00
Higher 25.00
Table B.7: Occupation (X036)
Occupation
”Employer/manager” 6.00
”Middle level non-manual o ce worker” 1.00
”Supervisory Non manual -o ce worker” 7.00
”Junior level non manual” 2.00
”Non manual -o ce worker” 13.00
”Foreman and supervisor” 3.00
”Skilled manual” 16.00
”Semi-skilled manual worker” 8.00
”Unskilled manual” 9.00
”Farmer: has own farm” 3.00
”Agricultural worker” 2.00
”Member of armed forces” 1.00
”Never had a job” 12.00
”Other” 0.00
Table B.8: Wave (S002)
Wave
1981-1984 9.00
1989-1993 13.00
1994-1999 31.00
1999-2004 17.00
2005-2007 29.00
Table B.9: Gender (X001)
Gender
Male 48.00
Female 52.00
Table B.10: Age (X003)
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Age 80,631 43.385 16.835 14 98
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Figure B.1: Country (S003)
Figure B.2: Countries
Table B.11: Anti-democratic values (E114)
Strong leader
Very good 8.00
Fairly good 22.00
Bad 31.00
Very bad 39.00
Appendix C
Images, tables and variables
WVS variables included in the technocratic mentality index:
1. How interested would you say you are in politics? (1) Very interested (2) somewhat
interested (3) not very interested (4) not at all interested. (A004)
2. For each of the following indicate how important it is in your life. Politics. Would you
say it is (1) very important (2) rather important (3) not very important (4) not at all
important?
3. I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like
you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you
might do it or would never under any circumstances do it: Signing a petition. (1) Have
done (2) might do (3) have never done.
4. I’m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in
the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it
would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind? More emphasis on technology.
(1) Good (2) don’t mind (3) bad.
5. If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most
important? (1) Give people more to say (2) fighting rising prices (3) protecting freedom
of speech.
6. People can only get rich at the expense of others vs. Wealth can grow so there’s enough
for everyone (1-10). (1) People can only get rich at the expense of others (10) Wealth
can grow so there’s enough for everyone
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Figure C.1: Technocratic attitudes in Europe
Table C.1: Technocratic Attitudes, Education and Abstention (Interactive Logistic Regres-
sion)
Dependent variable:
Abstention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index 1 1.834⇤⇤⇤ 1.292⇤⇤⇤ 0.723⇤⇤
(0.098) (0.158) (0.306)
Education Middle  0.530⇤⇤⇤  0.707⇤⇤⇤  0.472⇤
(0.061) (0.150) (0.270)
Education Upper  0.853⇤⇤⇤  1.370⇤⇤⇤  0.308
(0.082) (0.192) (0.319)
Controls No Yes
Index 1*Education Middle 0.652⇤⇤⇤ 1.352⇤⇤⇤
(0.248) (0.437)
Index 1*Education Upper 1.714⇤⇤⇤ 1.452⇤⇤⇤
(0.335) (0.547)
Observations 87,266 69,607 69,604 40,293
Log Likelihood  7,692.793  6,449.783  6,312.976  1,983.247
Akaike Inf. Crit. 15,389.590 12,905.570 12,637.950 4,068.494
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Figure C.2: Correlation between index 1 and 2.
Figure C.3: Correlation between index 1 and 3.
Figure C.4: Regressing the Human Development Index on the Technocratic Index
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Figure C.5: Human Development Index and avarage scores of the Technocratic Mentality
Index.
